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An Expressive Jurisprudence of the 
Establishment Clause 
Alex Geisinger* and Ivan E. Bodensteiner** 
I. Introduction 
Scholars recognize that government acts are expressive; that is, they 
affect the “social meaning” of behavior.1  Nowhere are the expressive 
effects of government acts more significant than when they affect an 
individual’s understanding of her ability to practice her religion.  When 
government allows a crèche to be placed on public property or provides 
educational vouchers that are used primarily at religious schools, its acts 
send signals to the population about what the community and the 
government prefer.2  As Justice O’Connor has observed, a religious 
symbol displayed on government property carries a message that affects 
one’s understanding of him or herself as an “insider” or “outsider,” 
favored or disfavored by the political community.3 
Yet while scholars have recognized that Establishment Clause cases 
are best understood as analyzing government’s expressive acts,4 they 
have yet to develop a comprehensive theory of just how government acts 
actually express particular meanings.  Without such a theory, efforts to 
 
 * Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso Law School.  The authors 
would like to thank Professors Rosalie Levinson and Michael Stein for their helpful 
thoughts and comments.  They also greatly benefited from a faculty workshop at Drexel 
University School of Law.  Extraordinary research assistance was provided by Jennifer 
Hagermann.  All errors are, of course, the authors’ alone. 
 ** Professor of Law, Valparaiso Law School. 
 1. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 
956-57 (1995); see also, David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressive Model of 
the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 586 (2002) (stating that private and 
public conduct can be expressive). 
 2. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 3. Id. (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not 
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that 
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.  Disapproval sends the 
opposite message.”). 
 4. See Cole infra note 121; Hill, infra note 121. 
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develop a meaningful Establishment Clause jurisprudence remain 
unsuccessful.  The purpose of this article is to provide such an expressive 
theory.  The article turns to both social and cognitive psychology to 
develop a model of expressive effects based on the way in which 
government acts affect beliefs about one’s relationship to community or 
government.  This belief-change theory suggests that the primary means 
by which government acts can affect belief is through the process of 
inference.  When the government places a crèche on public property, for 
example, such an act can lead to reasonable inferences about the 
religious preferences of both government and the community.  Such 
changes in belief can, in turn, affect the utility of acting in accordance 
with religious beliefs not preferred by the government or community.  By 
understanding the way in which inference works—in particular the 
effects of pre-existing beliefs and logical consistency on one’s inferential 
processes—a full expressive theory will be developed. 
Once the theory is developed, the article applies it to a number of 
Establishment Clause cases and ultimately, discusses the theory’s 
implications for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  The article will 
proceed as follows:  Section Two will provide a short introduction to 
existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence to highlight some of the 
difficulties and shortfalls of the way in which such cases are currently 
handled.  Section Three will provide a detailed model of the expressive 
theory while Section Four will apply the theory to a number of 
Establishment Clause cases.  Finally, we will discuss the implications of 
the expressive theory for Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Section 
Five.  It is our hope by the end of the article to have established a 
different, more comprehensive and intuitively satisfying test of 
Establishment Clause violations.  We hope also to shed some significant 
light on current problems in existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
along the way. 
II. The First Amendment and Religion 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech. . . .”5  While the first two 
clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, most 
obviously address religion, in recent years the Freedom of Speech Clause 
has become an important source of religious freedom.6  Even though the 
First Amendment explicitly restricts the actions of Congress, these three 
clauses apply to state and local government by incorporation into the 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6. See Section II.B below. 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 
A. Religion Clauses 
The language of the First Amendment leaves little doubt that the 
goal of the Free Exercise Clause is to promote religious freedom.8  One 
view of the Establishment Clause is that it is a “co-guarantor” of 
religious freedom because any “state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk 
that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that 
religious faith is real, not imposed.”9  In his plurality opinion in Van 
Orden v. Perry,10 Justice Rehnquist said the Court’s decisions, 
“Januslike, point in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause.  
One face looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious 
traditions throughout our Nation’s history . . . [and] [t]he other face looks 
toward the principle that governmental intervention in religious matters 
can itself endanger religious freedom.”11  He also refers to the “difficulty 
of respecting both faces.”12 
One of the difficulties in interpreting the religion clauses is the fact 
that history provides little guidance.  Professor Tribe described three 
primary views of religion among the Framers: 
[A]t least three distinct schools of thought . . . influenced the drafters 
of the Bill of Rights:  first, the evangelical view (associated primarily 
with Roger Williams) that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume 
the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not 
maintained”; second, the Jeffersonian view that the church should be 
walled off from the state in order to safeguard secular interests 
(public and private) “against ecclesiastical depredations and 
 
 7. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the 
Establishment Clause and applying it to the states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause and applying it to the states); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the Freedom of Speech 
Clause and applying it to the states).  Recently some Justices have questioned the full 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning whether the Establishment 
Clause should be applied to the states because they should be allowed to “pass laws that 
include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise 
rights or any other individual religious liberty interest.”). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the 
free exercise” of religion). 
 9. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The inclusion of both 
restraints upon the power of Congress to legislate concerning religious matters shows 
unmistakably that the Framers of the First Amendment were not content to rest the 
protection of religious liberty exclusively upon either clause.”). 
 10. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 683 (plurality opinion). 
 12. Id. 
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incursions”; and, third, the Madisonian view that religious and 
secular interests alike would be advanced best by diffusing and 
decentralizing power so as to assure competition among sects rather 
than dominance by any one.13 
Justice Brennan suggests that the use of history in interpreting the 
religion clauses is complicated by the changes between their adoption in 
1791 and the present.14  He said, 
our religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than 
were our forefathers.  They knew differences chiefly among 
Protestant sects.  Today the nation is far more heterogeneous 
religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of 
Catholics and Jews, but as well of those who worship according to no 
version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all.15 
This article assumes that the religious freedom “face” of the 
Establishment Clause is the dominant “face.”16  With this assumption, 
religious freedom becomes the core value of the religion clauses.  We 
will suggest that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, at least 
as applied recently, allows government to erode religious freedom 
because the Court fails to recognize how government acts affect 
individuals.  We will also focus our discussion on the Court’s efforts to 
analyze the messages sent by the government acts it considers.  As its 
decisions demonstrate, the Court does little to explain how government 
acts carry religious messages.  Rather, in most cases, the Court simply 
makes conclusory statements with little support that the message carried 
by a government act is either secular or religious in nature.17  Before 
developing our expressive theory, we will review briefly the Court’s 
approaches in Establishment Clause cases. 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky identifies “three major competing 
approaches to the establishment clause”:  first, “strict separation”; 
second, “neutrality;” and third, “accommodation/equality.”18  To explain 
 
 13. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988). 
 14. Abington, 374 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 15. Id. 
 16. We recognize there are other views, including the view that the Establishment 
Clause is simply jurisdictional, i.e., it places religion within the jurisdiction of the states 
rather than the federal government.  See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional 
Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843, 1844, 1849 (2006).  
It is not the purpose of this article to justify the assumption; others have written in 
support of the argument that the primary purpose of the Establishment Clause is to 
promote religious freedom.  See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Institutional Side of 
Religious Liberty: A New Model of the Establishment Clause, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 
1557 (2004). 
 17. See, e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). 
 18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 1192-98 
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what is meant by strict separation, Professor Chemerinsky refers to 
Everson v. Board of Education,19 where the Court said “[t]he First 
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.  That wall must 
be kept high and impregnable.”20  Government neutrality toward religion 
requires that it not “favor religion over secularism or one religion over 
others.”21  Recently, he says, several justices “have advanced a ‘symbolic 
endorsement’ test in evaluating the neutrality of a government’s 
action.”22  Endorsement and its different variations will be discussed 
below.  Lastly, “under the accommodation approach the government 
violates the establishment clause only if it literally establishes a church, 
coerces religious participation, or favors one religion over others.”23  
This, too, will be discussed below.  With the exception of strict 
separation, these three approaches are reflected in the Court’s 
jurisprudence at least since 1971.24  Following is a brief description of 
the dominant “tests” utilized in Establishment Clause cases, as well as a 
discussion of the limited insights provided by the Court into the 
relationship between government acts and religious freedom. 
1. Lemon Test 
Often attacked, but never overruled, the Court continues to utilize at 
least a modified version of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman,25 
where the Court held two state statutes, both providing state aid to 
church-related elementary and secondary schools, unconstitutional.26 
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, noted that the Establishment 
Clause was intended to afford protection against three main evils:  
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign 
in religious activity.”27  He then identified the “cumulative criteria” 
developed by the Court over many years, indicating that three tests could 
be gleaned from the cases.28  “First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
 
(Aspen 3rd ed. 2006). 
 19. Id. at 1192. 
 20. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 21. Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 1193. 
 22. Id. at 1194. 
 23. Id. at 1196. 
 24. See infra Section II.A.1-3. 
 25. See, e.g, McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005); Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668-69 (2002). 
 26. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971). 
 27. Id. at 612. 
 28. Id. 
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foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”29  Both 
the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes were found unconstitutional 
because they “foster[ed] an impermissible degree of entanglement,” 
which is determined by examining “the character and purpose of the 
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State 
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the 
religious authority.”30  While it does not necessarily lead to strict 
separation, the approach taken in Lemon is more consistent with strict 
separation than either endorsement or coercion. 
Recent cases help demonstrate the current status of the Lemon 
approach.  In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union,31 the 
Court upheld a preliminary injunction requiring that two counties’ 
displays of the Ten Commandments on the walls of their courthouses be 
removed.  Writing for the Court, Justice Souter concluded that the 
displays violated the purpose prong of the Lemon approach.32  Rejecting 
an invitation to abandon the purpose prong, Justice Souter said that 
[w]hen the government acts with the ostensible and predominant 
purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment 
Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality 
when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.  
Manifesting a purpose to favor one faith over another, or adherence 
to religion generally, clashes with the “understanding, reached . . . 
after decades of religious war, that liberty and social stability demand 
a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of all 
citizens. . . .”33 
Justice O’Connor concurred, stating that “the goal of the [Religion] 
Clauses is clear:  to carry out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious 
liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.”34  She agreed 
there was a violation of the Establishment Clause because the purpose 
behind the display at issue “conveys an unmistakable message of 
endorsement to the reasonable observer.”35  While this case, given the 
history of the display and the post-litigation efforts to disguise the 
purpose,36 presented an obvious message of endorsement, none of the 
Justices provided a meaningful explanation of the process by which a 
court arrives at the conclusion that a display such as the Ten 
 
 29. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). 
 30. Id. at 615. 
 31. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 32. Id. at 881. 
 33. Id. at 860 (citations omitted). 
 34. Id. at 882 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 35. Id. at 883. 
 36. Id. at 850. 
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Commandments in the Courthouse conveyed such an “unmistakable 
message.” 
The same day McCreary was decided, the Court, without a majority 
opinion, upheld the display of a monument, inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments, on the Texas State Capitol grounds in Van Orden v. 
Perry.37  Joined by three other Justices, Justice Rehnquist said: 
[w]hatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing 
with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its 
Capitol grounds.  Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of 
the monument and by our Nation’s history.38 
Justice Breyer concurred, supplying the critical fifth vote needed to 
uphold the display.39  He described the case as a “borderline case,” for 
which he sees “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal 
judgment.”40  To him, while the “Court’s prior tests provide useful 
guideposts—and might well lead to the same result the Court reaches 
today—no exact formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive 
cases.”41  He concludes that while the display communicates both a 
religious message and a secular message, it “conveys a predominantly 
secular message.”42  What is perhaps most surprising, given the fact that 
Van Orden and McCreary were decided on the same day, is the limited 
effort made by the plurality to explain just how the message in Van 
Orden was primarily secular while the message in McCreary was not.43  
Aside from general observations about the passive nature of the Van 
Orden display and its surroundings, little guidance is given regarding the 
process or framework for making this distinction.44 
The decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,45 upheld the Ohio 
voucher program through which state aid could be used for parochial 
schools.46  The Court in Zelman found no violation of the effects prong 
of the Lemon test.47  Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, said prior cases 
 
 37. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005). 
 38. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
 39. Id. at 698. 
 40. Id. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. (citations omitted). 
 42. Id. at 702. 
 43. Id. at 703. 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 702-03. 
 45. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 46. Id. at 644. 
 47. The result in Zelman was predictable after the decision in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793 (2000), where the Court upheld a federal program through which the federal 
government distributes funds to state and local government agencies, which in turn lend 
educational materials and equipment to public and private schools, with the amount 
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make clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect 
to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens 
who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result 
of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not 
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.48 
He went on to say that the “incidental advancement of a religious 
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is 
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, 
whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.”49  Again, the basis 
for this significant conclusion—that by giving money to individuals 
government has insulated itself from conclusions regarding its religious 
preferences—is not discussed.50 
Thus, while Lemon has survived, it is has been modified, 
particularly in financial aid cases, in a way that makes it less protective 
of religious liberty.  Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in 
Zelman, referred to the Lemon test as a “central tool in our analysis of 
[Establishment Clause] cases,” and indicated that the Court has “folded 
the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry.”51  Further, she 
said the opinion in Zelman “clarifies the basic inquiry when trying to 
determine whether a program that distributes aid to beneficiaries, rather 
than directly to service providers, has the primary effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion, or, as I have put it, of ‘endors[ing] or 
disapprov[ing] . . . religion.’”52  Clearly, the Lemon approach has been 
diluted when it is interpreted to tolerate the voucher program at issue in 
Zelman.  A modified version of the Lemon test, at least the second prong 
 
depending on enrollment.  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801.  Many of the private schools 
receiving the aid in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, are religiously affiliated and “pervasively 
sectarian.”  Id. at 804.  There was no majority opinion; Justices O’Connor and Breyer, 
concurred and supplied the votes needed for a 6-3 vote upholding the program as 
implemented in Jefferson Parish.  Id. at 793.  However, they wrote separately because 
they were troubled by the breadth of the plurality, particularly the fact that the 
“plurality’s rule states that government aid to religious schools does not have the effect of 
advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in 
content,” and because the plurality “rejects the distinction between direct and indirect aid, 
and holds that the actual diversion of secular aid by a religious school to the advancement 
of its religious mission is permissible.”  Id. at 837.  They were concerned that 
government aid distributed on a per capita basis, as opposed to “true private choice,” 
would affect perception and send a message of endorsement where religious 
indoctrination was supported by government by virtue of a per capita program.  Id. at 
842-43.  The majority would characterize the vouchers at issue in Zelman as “true private 
choice.”  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
 48. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 669 (citations omitted). 
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of it, is incorporated in the endorsement test.53 
2. Endorsement Test 
One of the leading proponents of the endorsement or neutrality 
approach on the Court was Justice O’Connor.54  She said, in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, that “[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique 
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.”55  In Lynch, the Court upheld the inclusion of a 
crèche in a city’s annual Christmas display, located in a private park in 
the downtown shopping district, because the context of the display 
detracted from the crèche’s religious message.56  In contrast, a crèche 
display at issue in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,57 was held unconstitutional because unlike 
the crèche in Lynch, “nothing in the context of the display detracts from 
the crèche’s religious message.”58  Moreover, 
[t]he Lynch display composed a series of figures and objects, each 
group of which had its own focal point.  Santa’s house and his 
reindeer were objects of attention separate from the crèche, and had 
their specific visual story to tell.  Similarly, whatever a “talking” 
wishing well may be, it obviously was a center of attention separate 
from the crèche.  Here, in contrast, the crèche stands alone:  it is the 
single element of the display on the Grand Staircase.59 
The display of a Hanukkah menorah, also at issue in Allegheny County, 
survived the constitutional challenge because, although it is a religious 
symbol, its “message is not exclusively religious.  The menorah is the 
primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both 
religious and secular dimensions.”60  The Court noted that the menorah 
was next to a Christmas tree display that also included a sign saluting 
liberty and, therefore, the display “simply recognizes that both Christmas 
and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season which has 
attained a secular status in our society.”61  Justice O’Connor concurred, 
 
 53. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 54. Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under 
the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 
N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986). 
 55. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 680-81. 
 57. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989). 
 58. Id. at 598. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 613-14. 
 61. Id. at 616. 
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but indicated her analysis of the message sent by the display differs from 
that of Justice Blackmun.62  She concluded that 
the city of Pittsburgh’s combined holiday display of a Chanukah 
menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign saluting liberty does not have 
the effect of conveying an endorsement of religion. . . .  In my view, 
the relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is whether 
the city of Pittsburgh’s display of the menorah, the religious symbol 
of a religious holiday, next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting 
liberty sends a message of government endorsement of Judaism or 
whether it sends a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one’s 
own beliefs. . . .  The message of pluralism conveyed by the city’s 
combined holiday display is not a message that endorses religion over 
nonreligion.63 
Thus, even in cases where the Court makes efforts to describe its basis 
for analyzing the meaning presented by a government display, the factors 
used in the analysis vary. 
Different versions of the symbolic endorsement approach can be 
found in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,64 in 
which the Court held that it was a violation of the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment to preclude the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a large 
Latin cross in the park across from the Ohio statehouse, and that 
allowing the display would not violate the Establishment Clause.  Justice 
O’Connor, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer concurring, concluded 
that the cross should be allowed because a reasonable observer would not 
perceive it as an endorsement of religion since there was “a sign 
disclaiming government sponsorship or endorsement,” which helps 
“remove doubt about the state approval of [the] religious message.”65  
She also said that the endorsement test must be applied “from the 
perspective of a hypothetical observer who is presumed to possess a 
certain level of information that all citizens might not share” and 
must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community 
and forum in which the religious display appears [and] the general 
history of the place in which the cross is displayed. . . .  An informed 
member of the community will know how the public space in 
question has been used in the past.66 
Justice Stevens dissented, saying there is symbolic endorsement if a 
reasonable person observing the display would perceive government 
 
 62. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 632, 634-35. 
 64. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 65. Id. at 776 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. at 780-81. 
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support for religion.67  He states, 
If a reasonable person could perceive a government endorsement of 
religion from a private display, then the State may not allow its 
property to be used as a forum for that display.  No less stringent rule 
can adequately protect non-adherents from a well-grounded 
perception that their sovereign supports a faith to which they do not 
subscribe.68 
Justice Stevens was critical of Justice O’Connor’s reasonable person, 
indicating that her person “comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being 
finer than the tort-law model.”69  Clearly, the Stevens version of the 
endorsement approach is more protective of religious liberty than Justice 
O’Connor’s approach. 
3. Coercion Test 
There are two different versions of the coercion test, which 
Professor Chemerinsky characterizes as the accommodation approach.70  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Lee v. Weisman,71 applied his 
version of coercion to a graduation prayer made part of the official 
school graduation ceremony and found it inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause.72  He stated: 
[t]he undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and 
control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, 
as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, 
at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and 
benediction.  This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real 
as any overt compulsion.73 
Justice Scalia’s version, outlined in his dissenting opinion joined by 
Justices Rehnquist, White and Thomas in Lee v. Weisman,74 would find a 
violation of the Establishment Clause only where government acts are 
“backed by threat of penalty.”75  According to Justice Scalia, the 
 
 67. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. at 799-800. 
 69. Id. at 800 n. 5. 
 70. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 1196. 
 71. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, 
and Souter, joined Kennedy’s opinion but also wrote separately to clarify that while 
coercion violates the Establishment Clause, it is not necessary to show coercion in order 
to establish a violation of the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 599-631 (concurring 
opinions). 
 72. Id. at 593. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 631. 
 75. Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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“Framers were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship by the 
National Government; but, as their own sponsorship of nonsectarian 
prayer in public events demonstrates, they understood that ‘[s]peech is 
not coercive, the listener may do as he likes.’”76  His opinion is critical of 
Justice Kennedy’s version of coercion, because he says it equates 
coercion and pressure.77  In most cases, Justice Kennedy’s version of 
coercion may result in the same holding as the endorsement approach; 
however, Justice Scalia’s version of coercion would result in a violation 
of the Establishment Clause only where government creates a religion or 
adopts a law requiring certain religious practices.78  In short, if Justice 
Scalia’s version prevails, there should be very few violations of the 
Establishment Clause.79 
4. Our Nation’s History 
At least one case, Marsh v. Chambers,80 ignores most Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence and upholds the constitutionality of a state 
legislature employing a Presbyterian minister to begin each session with 
a prayer because that practice is “deeply embedded in the history and 
tradition of this country.”81  Ignoring the religious message of such 
behavior altogether, Justice Burger rests his decision on the fact that this 
unique, unambiguous, and unbroken history of more than two hundred 
years leaves little doubt that Nebraska’s practice is part of the fabric of 
our society.82  Justice Rehnquist, joined by three other Justices, takes 
essentially the same approach in Van Orden,83 where he indicates his 
“analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our 
Nation’s history.”84  Citing Marsh v. Chambers and listing our 
government’s numerous “acknowledgements” of “our Nation’s 
heritage,” Justice Rehnquist concludes that the Texas display of the Ten 
Commandments does not violate the Establishment Clause.85  Justice 
Breyer, in his concurring opinion, finds the forty-year history of the 
monument significant in that it was uncontested, thus indicating “as a 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 640-43. 
 78. Id. at 640. 
 79. In fact, Justice Scalia’s approach arguably makes the Establishment Clause 
redundant because when government coerces religious belief it presumably violates the 
Free Exercise Clause.  Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 S. CT. 
REV. 123, 134. 
 80. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 81. Id. at 786. 
 82. Id. at 792. 
 83. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 84. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
 85. Id. at 678. 
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practical matter of degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive.”86  It 
is not readily apparent why a durable practice, such as the one in Marsh 
dating back to 1791, should be insulated from an Establishment Clause 
attack.87 
B. Religion and Freedom of Speech 
When government restricts religious speech, it can be challenged 
under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  Because a 
restriction on religious speech is a content-based restriction, or possibly a 
viewpoint-based restriction, it triggers strict scrutiny analysis.88  The 
defendant government may attempt to justify its restriction on religious 
speech by arguing that to allow the religious speech on government 
property or to fund the religious speech would violate the Establishment 
Clause.89  Here the Establishment Clause becomes a defense when the 
government argues that it has a compelling interest in avoiding a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.90 
Several of these cases have arisen in the context of an educational 
institution that gives student groups access to school facilities, but denies 
access to religious groups out of concern that allowing such access 
would violate the Establishment Clause.  The court has consistently 
rejected this defense.  For example, in Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School,91 the Court held that the school had created a “limited 
public forum,” which can be restricted by group or topic,92 but not by 
viewpoint.  It rejected the Establishment Clause defense by concluding 
that the exclusion of the Good News Club was viewpoint based; that is, it 
was excluded because it addressed permissible topics from a religious 
perspective.93  While the school permitted discussion of topics “such as 
 
 86. Id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 87. As demonstrated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it is 
better to end unconstitutional practices late instead of ratifying them by Supreme Court 
decision. 
 88. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). 
 89. See generally Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98. 
 92. This suggests a school could exclude religious groups, or religion as a topic. 
 93. 533 U.S. at 111-12.  This determination is not obvious and was contested by 
three Justices in dissent.  Id. at 132-33, 138.  Justice Stevens said there are three 
categories of speech for “religious purposes”—first, religious speech about a particular 
topic from a religious point of view; second, religious speech that amounts to worship; 
and third, religious speech that is “aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief 
in a particular religious faith.”  Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He said the school 
prohibited the use of its facilities for “religious purposes,” intending to allow the first 
category, but excluding the second and third types.  Id. at 132-33.  Justice Souter, joined 
by Justice Ginsburg, said Good News intended to use the school facilities “for an 
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child rearing, and of ‘the development of character and morals from a 
religious perspective,’”94 it precluded the Good News Club because it 
determined its activities to be religious in nature—“the equivalent of 
religious instruction itself.”95  Having concluded that the school engaged 
in viewpoint discrimination, and therefore had to satisfy strict scrutiny, 
the court rejected the school’s Establishment Clause argument.96  
Relying on several earlier decisions,97 the Court rejected the 
Establishment Clause defense because the Club’s meetings were held 
after school hours, were not sponsored by the school, and were open to 
any student who obtained parental consent, not just Club members.98  
The school argued that because its policy involves elementary school 
children, the children will perceive that the school is endorsing the Club 
and will feel coercive pressure to participate because the Club’s activities 
take place on school grounds, even though they occur after school 
hours.99  Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court, gave five reasons why 
this argument was unpersuasive.100  First, allowing the Club to speak on 
school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it.101  Second, in 
determining whether the community would feel coercive pressure to 
engage in the Club’s activities, the relevant community is the parents, not 
the children, because the children cannot attend without their parents’ 
permission and, therefore, cannot be coerced into engaging in the 
religious activities.102  Third, even if, as suggested in earlier cases, 
elementary school children are more impressionable than adults, this is 
not significant here because “we have never extended our Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence to foreclose private religious conduct during non-
school hours merely because it takes place on school premises where 
elementary school children may be present.”103  Fourth, even if the 
possible misperceptions by school children were considered, there is no 
support for the theory that small children would perceive endorsement 
 
evangelical service of worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of 
Christian conversion,” which is clearly a use that would violate the Establishment Clause.  
Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 108. 
 95. Id. at 104. 
 96. The Court did not decide whether government’s interest in avoiding an 
Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination because it 
determined the school did not have a valid Establishment Clause interest. 
 97. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 98. 533 U.S. at 113-14. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 114-115, 117-118. 
 101. Id. at 114. 
 102. Id. at 115. 
 103. Id. 
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here because the meetings were held in a combined high school resource 
room and middle school special education room, not in an elementary 
school classroom, the instructors were not school teachers, and the 
children in the group were not all the same age as in the normal 
classroom setting.104  Fifth, 
even if we were to inquire into the minds of school children in this 
case, we cannot say the danger that children would misperceive the 
endorsement of religion is any greater than the danger that they 
would perceive a hostility toward the religious viewpoint if the Club 
were excluded from the public forum.105 
A related case, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University 
of Virginia,106 involved a state university’s refusal to give student activity 
funds to a student organization, Wide Awake Publications, the goal of 
which was “[t]o publish a magazine of philosophical and religious 
expression,” “[t]o facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of 
sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints,” and “[t]o provide a 
unifying focus for Christians of multi-cultural backgrounds.”107  The 
University established a student activities fund “to support a broad range 
of extracurricular student activities that ‘are related to the educational 
purpose of the University.’”108  Among other things, it authorized 
payment of outside contractors for the printing costs of a variety of 
student publications.109  However, the University withheld authorization 
for payments on behalf of Wide Awake because it primarily “promote[d] 
or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate 
reality.”110  As in Good News Club, the student organization challenged 
the denial as a violation of the Free Speech Clause and the Court 
interpreted the University’s action as viewpoint discrimination, subject to 
strict scrutiny, because it justified its denial of funds to Wide Awake “on 
the ground that the contents of Wide Awake reveal an avowed religious 
perspective.”111  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded 
that funding Wide Awake would not violate the Establishment Clause 
because the program at issue is neutral toward religion.112  Justice Souter, 
joined in dissent by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg and Breyer, stated that 
“[u]sing public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the word is 
 
 104. Id. at 117. 
 105. Id. at 118. 
 106. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 107. Id. at 825-26. 
 108. Id. at 824. 
 109. Id. at 822. 
 110. Id. at 827. 
 111. Id. at 832. 
 112. Id. at 840. 
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categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause 
was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this use of 
public money.”113 
The plaintiffs in this line of cases are obtaining relief based on the 
Free Speech Clause, rather than the religion clauses.  In rejecting the 
Establishment Clause defense raised by the government in these cases, 
the Court decided that providing the access or the funds requested by the 
plaintiffs would not constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.114  
This does not mean that the Free Speech clause trumps the Establishment 
Clause; rather, it means only that in these situations providing the access 
or the funds sought by the plaintiffs would not violate the Establishment 
Clause.115 
C. Summary 
Existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a confused amalgam 
consisting of at least three distinct approaches to issues of how 
government acts affect individuals’ religious behavior.  While some 
general trends—particularly a trend to decrease the protections of 
religious freedom—can be gleaned from recent decisions, none of these 
decisions provides a meaningful basis for distinguishing between acts 
that do and do not affect an individual’s ability to practice his or her 
religion. Rather in most cases the Court provides only conclusory 
statements regarding whether the messages sent by the government are 
secular or religious with little analysis of the basis for such conclusions. 
It seems clear that Establishment Clause protection from the 
government is shrinking and, as a result, it plays almost no role in 
assuring religious freedom.  In the key area of financial aid to religious 
institutions, Zelman means that the government need only have a secular 
purpose and use private citizens as the conduit through which the aid 
passes before it reaches a religious institution.116  This allows 
government to subsidize religious instruction and proselytizing at 
“pervasively sectarian” institutions.  Public displays of religious symbols 
will be allowed unless government is careless and displays religious 
symbols standing alone without articulating a secular purpose.117  Private 
displays of religious symbols and religious speech on government 
 
 113. Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 114. Good News v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 115. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-19 (2001). 
 116. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002). 
 117. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984). 
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property designated as a limited forum will generally be protected by the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, with very little interference 
from the Establishment Clause.118  The Establishment Clause still has 
some bite when the government sponsors prayer at school events, such as 
graduation and football games, although this may be precarious with two 
new justices.119  We believe the Court is closing its eyes to the true 
effects of government acts, such as displaying religious symbols, funding 
religious institutions, and allowing religious activities and displays on 
government-owned property, and how these acts restrict religious 
freedom.  Further, we believe expressive law has much to add to this 
discussion.  None of the three dominant tests—Lemon, endorsement, and 
coercion—is necessarily inconsistent with the Establishment Clause goal 
of religious liberty, with the possible exception of Scalia’s version of 
coercion.  The key is in determining what constitutes an endorsement, 
what makes one feel like an outsider, and what causes one to feel subtle 
pressure or coercion.  Expressive law provides a framework in which to 
explore these questions and thereby assists in identifying government 
acts that detract from religious freedom. 
III. Expressive Theory 
Expressive law examines the connection between law and the social 
meaning of particular behaviors.120  In the case of the Establishment 
Clause, many authors have recognized the relevance of this inquiry for 
analyzing the meaning of government acts in the religious sphere.121  
While many scholars note the relevance of the expressive inquiry to 
Establishment Clause questions, none to date have attempted to develop 
and apply an expressive model of how government acts affect the social 
meaning of acting in accordance with one’s religious beliefs.  This 
Section develops a comprehensive, rational choice-based model of 
expressive law and explains the need-reinforcement process that 
 
 118. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 119. In Sante Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), the most 
recent decision striking down government-sponsored prayer at a school event, Justice 
O’Connor voted with the majority and Justice Rehnquist dissented along with Justices 
Scalia and Thomas.  Assuming their replacements, Justices Roberts and Alito, join 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, the decision becomes much closer. 
 120. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 
(1995). 
 121. See generally David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressive Model of 
the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559 (2002); Jessie Hill, Putting Religious 
Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
491 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine & Discourse of 
Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1874-91 (2004); Mark D. Rosen, 
Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (2003). 
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underlies individuals’ desires for community approval.  In later sections, 
the model is applied to an analysis of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.122 
A. The Reasoned Action Model 
Traditional economics literature operates from the premise that 
people act rationally to maximize their own utility when choosing among 
alternatively available courses of conduct.123  Under this framework, 
known as “rational choice theory,” law operates by varying the cost to an 
individual of satisfying her preferences through the use of exogenous 
sanctions such as fines or imprisonment.124  For any given activity, 
increasing the associated cost will decrease an individual’s desire to 
choose that opportunity; conversely, a decrease in cost will encourage an 
individual to satisfy her desire by choosing that opportunity.125  In other 
words, manipulating the opportunity set available to a given actor will 
alter her subsequent choices.  This standard economic account has 
proved a useful baseline method for modeling human behavior, and 
thereby predicting the effects of particular policies.126 
Expressive law seeks to understand the relationship between law 
and the social meaning of a particular behavior.127  While some authors 
 
 122. See infra Section IV.B.1-3. 
 123. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 99-103 (8th ed. 1999); see also MARK PERLMAN & CHARLES R. MCCANN, JR., 
THE PILLARS OF ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING: FACTORS AND MARKETS 301 (2000) 
(describing the market as a “model of allocative efficiency”); see generally, Alex 
Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002) (our 
Expressive Theory is based on the comprehensive discussion of expressive law contained 
therein). 
 124. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1649, 1650 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Expressive Law] (“In the vision of law 
that dominates economics-influenced legal theory, law imposes sanctions to solve 
problems.”).  McAdams uses this axiom as a departure point for his version of expressive 
law theory.  See id. 
 125. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1 (for a discussion of this point made in the 
context of criminal activity). 
 126. Two Nobel laureates defend this model from the perspective that preferences are 
relatively static and that studying variable taste is a futile endeavor.  See George J. Stigler 
& Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV., 76 (1977). 
 127. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 
(1998) (describing the role of law in the development of social norms, and socioeconomic 
law and economics, which seeks to inject psychological and social factors related to 
wealth and race into otherwise “neutral” economic analyses); Lawrence Lessig, The 
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, The 
Regulation] (examining the social construction of orthodoxy and its place in the law).; 
McAdams, Expressive Law, supra note 124 (suggesting that law may be alternatively 
conceptualized for its expressive, as well as its traditionally acknowledged, enforcement 
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consider the social, or symbolic, meaning of certain legal doctrines or 
decisions, others consider the impact that law may have on mediating the 
social meaning of an activity.128  The crucial element of this analysis is 
the nexus between law, norms, and social meaning.  In certain situations, 
law, or other forms of government action, may cause individuals to alter 
their own behavior because either the action induces them to change their 
tastes (internalization) or creates a fear of bearing social sanctions 
(second order sanctions).129  This article is primarily concerned with the 
latter scenario, where government acts may affect individual behavior 
because the individual fears social sanction. 
Our expressive theory is based on the reasoned action model of 
decision-making, which identifies two factors affecting an individual’s 
intent to undertake a behavior.130  These factors are the individual’s 
attitude toward the behavior itself and her beliefs about what other 
people think of the behavior.  The reasoned action model is diagrammed 
in Figure 1.131 
 
 
functions); Cass R. Sunstein, Law, Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (considering how legal statements might be 
designed to change social norms). 
 128. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 681-83 
(1998). 
 129. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 35 (2002) (for a review of the development of the field and the nuances contained 
therein, as the above account is synthesized and abbreviated). 
 130. MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH 13-18 (1975). 
 131. Figure 1 is derived from RUSSELL VEITCH & DANIEL ARKKELIN, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 109 (1995).  For 
additional sources of support for the reasoned action model, see Icek Ajzen & Martin 
Fishbein, Attitudinal and Normative Variables as Predictors of Specific Behavior, 27(1) 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 41 (1973); Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, The 
Prediction of Behavior from Attitudinal and Normative Variables, 6(4) J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 466 (1970).  For a recent overview of research in this area, see Icek 
Ajzen, Nature and Operation of Attitudes, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 27 (2001) (reviewing 
research published between 1996 and 1999). 
GEISINGER.DOC 10/9/2007  2:09:44 PM 
96 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
As the model suggests, an individual decides whether to engage in 
particular behaviors by reasoning about how (a) good or bad, and 
(b) likely or unlikely, the outcomes associated with a given behavior 
(called the “behavioral attitude”).  An individual also considers the 
amount and quality of social pressure to engage or not engage in that 
specific behavior (referred to as the “subjective norm”).  The behavioral 
attitude and subjective norm combine to determine an individual’s intent 
to act.132  Thus, understanding one’s attitude toward a behavior and one’s 
belief about the subjective norm can help to determine133 one’s desire to 
undertake that behavior.134 
B. Beliefs as the Building Blocks of Attitude 
While the subjective norm is defined in terms of an individual’s 
 
 132. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 131, at 110-12 (explaining the theory and 
relating it to environmental perception).  One interesting aspect of the model is that it 
helps us understand when attitude and behavior are inconsistent; i.e., when one is 
predisposed positively toward a behavior but still does not undertake the behavior given 
the subjective expectations regarding social pressure. 
 133. The model itself can be deceptively simple.  In particular, the model conceives 
of the individual in a vacuum, uninfluenced by social context.  Intentions to act, of 
course, rely significantly on social context.  For example, an individual may have 
different attitudes toward an activity based on the normative group to which she belongs.  
See generally ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF NORMS AND 
GROUP MEMBERSHIP (Deborah J. Terry & Michael A. Hogg eds., 2000) (Criminals, for 
example, think differently about crime than police, and an individual may have a 
different attitude toward pollution in her business community than in her home or family 
community.). 
 134. Note that intending to undertake a behavior and actually acting are not always 
the same.  See Lessig, The Regulation, supra note 127, at 955-57.  There may be physical 
limitations to behavior.  See id.  Thus, I may desire to climb a mountain, but weather, 
geography, or physical exhaustion may keep me from so doing.  See id. (noting that 
physical limitations may keep us from doing what we want). 
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beliefs about what others think of a behavior, it is more difficult to 
conceive of the concept of attitude in terms of belief.135  This article is 
most concerned about the relationship between government behavior and 
the subjective norm.  However, attitude formation and the structure of 
belief must be understood in order to provide a complete model of how 
government acts affect beliefs.  Attitude toward a behavior can be 
defined as a function of individuals’ beliefs about the consequences of 
the behavior,136 the certainty of their beliefs, and their evaluations (either 
positive or negative)137 of those consequences.138  This relationship can 
 
 135. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 131, at 109.  We will discuss in much 
greater detail the subjective norm in infra Section III.C. 
 136. See FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 130, at 218 (One potentially significant 
limitation on the effective use of a belief-based theory is the fact that any behavior is 
associated with a virtually limitless number of beliefs, thus significantly limiting the 
ability to analyze the effect law will have on attitude.  However, only a relatively small 
number of beliefs affect our attitude.  Due to limited attention span, apprehension, and 
information processing abilities, individuals can only process a small number of beliefs at 
any single time.  Thus, although an individual may have a large number of beliefs that, if 
given time, she could recall about a particular behavior and its consequences, only a 
maximum of between five and nine of these beliefs underlie her attitude.). 
 137. Evaluation of a consequence simply means that one thinks positively or 
negatively about the consequence of an action.  Consider one’s attitude toward wearing a 
seatbelt.  We can see that certain consequences of wearing a seatbelt are generally 
positively evaluated (e.g., safety), while certain consequences are generally negatively 
evaluated (e.g., discomfort).  Evaluations of consequences are formed by standard 
processes of conditioning.  See, e.g., id. at 277 (noting that evaluations in the end, must 
be accounted for by the process of conditioning).  These processes include: operant 
conditioning, classical conditioning, and vicarious conditioning.  See VEITCH & 
ARKKELIN supra note 131, at 105-07. 
 138. The elements of the belief-based theory are as follows: 
(1) An individual holds many beliefs about a given object; i.e., the object may 
be seen as related to various attributes, such as other objects, characteristics, 
goals, etc.  (2) Associated with each of the attributes is an implicit evaluative 
response, i.e., an attitude.  (3) Through conditioning, the evaluative responses 
are associated with the attitude object.  (4) The conditioned evaluative 
responses summate, and thus (5) on future occasions the attitude object will 
elicit this summated evaluative response, i.e., the overall attitude. 
FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 130, at 29.  The theory of belief-based attitude and intent 
has its roots in the earliest work of Professor Fishbein.  See, e.g., Martin Fishbein, An 
Investigation of the Relationships Between Beliefs About an Object and the Attitude 
Toward That Object, 16 HUM. REL. 233 (1963).  For a description of the belief-based 
theory of attitude and intent formation, this Article will rely primarily on FISHBEIN & 
AJZEN, supra note 130, which remains the most comprehensive exegesis of the theory.  It 
should, however, be noted that the theory has been further elaborated in a number of 
articles—sometimes responding to criticism—by Professors Fishbein, Ajzen, and others.  
Compare Vernon E. Cronen & Richard L. Conville, Fishbein’s Conception of Belief 
Strength: A Theoretical, Methodological and Experimental Critique, 42(2) SPEECH 
MONOGRAPHS 143 (1975) (criticizing the theory) and Joseph R. Priester & Monique A. 
Fleming, Artifact or Meaningful Theoretical Constructs?: Examining Evidence for 
Nonbelief-and Belief-Based Attitude Change Processes, 6(1) J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 67 
(1997) (criticizing the theory) with Martin Fishbein & Susan Middlestadt, Noncognitive 
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be expressed by the equation Ao = Σ biei, where A is the attitude toward 
behavior O, b is the belief about O (i.e., the subjective certainty that O 
will result in consequence i), e is the evaluation of the consequence, and 
n is the number of beliefs.139 
This theory of beliefs, as the basis of attitude, can be correlated with 
the subjective expected utility theory of behavioral science.  According 
to this concept, when a person has to make a behavioral choice, he will 
select that alternative which has the highest subjective expected utility 
(i.e., the alternative which is likely to lead to the most favorable 
outcomes).140  This can be stated as SEU=Σ SPiUi where SPi is the 
subjective probability that the choice of this alternative will lead to some 
outcome i and Ui is utility of the outcome i.141  This model can be recast 
in terms of beliefs about consequences—that is, SP=b and U=e or the 
equation Ao = Σ biei..142 
Consider a simple example of the attitude toward wearing a seatbelt 
while driving.  An individual may have the following salient belief about 
the behavior, which she evaluates positively—it will provide more 
protection in case of an accident—and the following salient beliefs, 
which she evaluates negatively—it will be uncomfortable, and it will 
restrict her movement.  The certainty with which she holds these beliefs, 
in conjunction with her evaluations of each of these outcomes, can 
determine her attitude regarding the behavior.  To see why, assume a 
simple scale of certainty that runs from 0 (no certainty) to +100 (strong 
certainty) and a similar scale for evaluation -100 (strong dislike) to +100 
(strong like).  Applying these factors could have the following results: 
 
Effects on Attitude Formation and Change: Fact or Artifact?, 4(2) J. CONSUMER 
PSYCHOL. 181 (1995) (responding to criticism and analyzing a number of critical studies 
and arguing that the contribution of factors other than belief based expectancy-value 
measures to the prediction of attitude can be seen as a methodological artifact of using 
inappropriate measures) and Martin Fishbein & Susan E. Middlestadt, A Striking Lack of 
Evidence for Nonbelief-Based Attitude Formation and Change: A Response to Five 
Commentaries, 6(1) J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 107 (1997) (arguing that most criticism 
avoids assessing the belief-based structure that underlies attitude formation). 
 139. FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 130, at 30-31. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.; see also Lynn R. Anderson & Martin Fishbein, Prediction of Attitude From 
the Number, Strength, and Evaluative Aspect of Beliefs About the Attitude Object: A 
Comparison of Summation and Congruity Theories, 2(3) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 437 (1965) (arguing that basic summation of belief and evaluation yields 
significantly better predictions of attitude than congruity theory). 
GEISINGER.DOC 10/9/2007  2:09:44 PM 
2007] AN EXPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE 99 
Figure 2 
 
Based on these beliefs alone, the individual would be inclined not to 
wear a seatbelt when driving, but such an inclination would not be very 
strong (an overall negative utility of only -900). 
1. The Anatomy of Belief 
Beliefs143 result from three different, but related, processes.  At their 
very base, beliefs are formed as the result of an individual’s direct 
sensory perception of the world (descriptive belief).144  For example, if 
an individual sees Robert and Tom standing next to each other, she may 
come to the conclusion that Robert is taller than Tom.  This is a simple 
process of descriptive belief development.  Inferential beliefs, on the 
other hand, are logical conclusions formed from descriptive and other 
beliefs.145  Thus, if an individual sees Peter is taller than Robert, she may 
conclude that Peter is also taller than Tom, even if she does not see them 
together.  This belief is simply the result of applying logical processes to 
prior belief.  Finally, beliefs may be formed based on information 
provided by a third party.146  Thus, if an individual is told that Peter is 
taller than Tom, she may reach such a conclusion regardless of pre-
existing knowledge of Tom’s and Peter’s heights. 
Similarly, after a period of economic prosperity with low 
unemployment rates, if an individual reads in a reputable newspaper that 
unemployment rates are consistently increasing, it is likely that the 
individual will change his belief about unemployment rates specifically.  
Further, through inferential processes, this information will influence the 
individual’s belief regarding the general robustness of the American 
economy. 
Beliefs about consequences of behavior can be held with different 
 
 143. A belief is a conviction or feeling of the truth of some proposition or the reality 
of some being or phenomenon.  WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 200 (3d ed. 1993). 
 144. Fishbein & Azen, supra note 130, at 131-32. 
 145. Id. at 132, 143-45. 
 146. Id. at 133. 
Belief Certainty Evaluation Be 
    
Protects me in accidents +30 +90 +2700 
Restricts movement 
Is uncomfortable 
+40 
+40 
 -40 
-50 
 -1600 
-2000 
  Ao = Σ biei   -900 
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degrees of certainty.  In the case of informational belief, the 
trustworthiness of the speaker and other factors will affect certainty.147  
In the case of inferential beliefs, one’s certainty is a function of either 
probabilistic or evaluative consistency.148  Evaluative consistency is a 
function of whether individuals evaluate objects or behaviors positively 
or negatively in relation to one another.149  Negative or positive 
evaluations tend to be consistently held.150  Thus, if an individual 
positively values religious freedom, but has a negative attitude toward 
China, she is likely to form the inferential belief that China has no 
religious freedom.151  Such a conclusion maintains the relation between 
her evaluation of China and religious freedom.  Probabilistic consistency, 
on the other hand, refers to the logic used to develop an inferential 
belief.152  The better the logical reasoning, the more certainty with which 
a belief is held.153  For example, a person might hold the following two 
beliefs. 
(1) The People’s Republic of China is a communist country. 
(2) Communist countries do not have religious freedom. 
On the basis of these beliefs, she might form the inference that China 
does not have religious freedom.154  Such a conclusion is logically 
consistent, and thus likely will be held with a similarly high degree of 
certainty.155 
In sum, beliefs are created in one of three ways:  through direct 
experience, through inferential reasoning, or through the provision of 
information by third parties.  Further, belief formation is constrained by 
 
 147. Note that the willingness to accept information is itself a function of descriptive 
and inferential belief regarding the trustworthiness and veracity of the source of the 
information.  Thus, if a gossip magazine writes that Tom Cruise and Madonna are having 
a baby, one may be less willing to accept this information than if it were published by the 
New York Times.  Further, a message’s information may be mediated by its ability to be 
comprehended and the attention given to it by its audience.  See FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra 
note 130, at 452 (examining the significance of source factors in the production of 
communication effects and the persuasion process). 
 148. Id. at 145. 
 149. Id. at 114-15. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 144. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Note, however, that probabilistic consistency does not need to exactly follow the 
rules of formal logic.  Id. at 145. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Note, as well, that the certainty of inferential beliefs is additive; thus, if one does 
not believe with certainty that communist countries have no religious freedom, his lack of 
certainty will transfer to his concluding belief.  FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 130, at 
144. 
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either logical or evaluative consistency; and belief certainty is itself a 
function of these factors.  Thus, while individual beliefs change, 
individuals are not blank slates; their prior experience and evaluations 
will affect their ability to change their attitudes and affect the certainty 
with which they hold their beliefs. 
C. The Need-Reinforcement Principle 
We must now turn our attention to the subjective norm. Our analysis 
will consist of two parts.  The first part describes why individuals care 
about what community members think of them and how community 
norms arise.  Along the way, we will shed some light on the nature of 
community.  Second, we will place beliefs about the subjective norm 
alongside an attitude to provide a basic model from which government 
activity’s effects on individual behavior may be analyzed. 
1. The Game-Theoretic Model of Norms 
To begin, we will consider the way in which the interdependence of 
rational self-interested individuals leads to the development of 
community norms.156  Most law and economics scholars conceive of 
norms in game-theoretic terms as arising from cooperation problems that 
confront rational individuals acting in their own self-interest.157  A 
classic example of a cooperation problem is the “prisoner’s dilemma,” 
which presents two rational self-interested individuals who must choose 
between alternate strategies.158  In the circumstance of the game, pursuit 
of individual self-interest leads to worse results for each individual than 
if he or she cooperates with the other.159 
 
 156. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms]. 
 157. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics 
Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2126 n.235 (1996); Steven A. Hechter, Creating Safe 
Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1999); Steven A. 
Hechter, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 877, 902-03 n.90 (2001); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms 
in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 797 n.52 (1998); Elmer J. Schaefer, 
Predicting Defection, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 443, 462 (2002) (discussing social norms, 
specifically signaling, as an answer to defections in prisoner’s dilemma problems with 
cooperation theories). 
 158. David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meaning of Equality, 
38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 331, 409-410 (2001). 
 159. The most successful strategy is the well-known “tit-for-tat” strategy that 
emerged victorious from a number of computer tournaments run by Robert Axelrod.  See 
generally id. at 377 (2001).  Following the tournaments, Axelrod simulated natural 
selection with sixty-three programs by adjusting the number of offspring produced in 
each successive round based on a strategy’s performance in the previous round.  Id.  
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Take, for example, the following scenario between prisoners Row 
and Column, who are placed in separate cells at the police station and are 
being questioned.  If one inmate tells on the other, the tattler will be let 
off for cooperation, and the other prisoner will get a three-year sentence.  
If neither tells, each will be found guilty of a lesser offense of one year in 
prison.  If both tell, each will be convicted of a more significant offense 
and incarcerated for two years.  The options and consequences can be 
diagrammed as follows, in Figure 3: 
Figure 3 
 
 
Given these circumstances, Row will always tell.  Here is why.  First, 
assume that Column will tell.  If Row does not do likewise, he will get 
three years in jail; if he does tell, he will receive a two-year sentence.  
Now assume that Column does not tell.  Row will not be imprisoned if 
he tells, and he will be punished with one year in jail if he remains silent.  
In these circumstances, it is better for the self-interested Row to tell, 
regardless of Column’s actions.  The dominant strategy for both players 
will therefore be to tell, resulting in each getting locked up for two years.  
By contrast, if neither tells, each gets only one year in jail.  
Consequently, the pursuit of individual self-interest by Row and Column 
leads to worse results than if they had cooperated and both withheld 
information. 
While defection is the dominant strategy in a one-time play of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation is a natural result of such a problem in 
situations where the parties will play the game a substantial number of 
times.160  Let us assume that Column and Row are now, respectively, a 
wholesaler and retailer of goods.  They desire to create a relationship 
whereby Column will supply the goods at a certain cost.  If Column 
delivers the quality of goods agreed upon, both parties will make two.  If 
 
After one thousand rounds of play, weak programs became extinct, and so did some 
predatory programs that had survived by exploiting dwindling programs lower in the food 
chain.  Id.  Interestingly, in this game designed to simulate Darwinian natural selection, 
tit-for-tat won again, just as it had in Axelrod’s tournaments.  Id. 
 160. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19 (2000) (developing the foundation 
for a theory of norms as signals of one’s cooperativeness). 
 Cooperate 
(withhold) 
Defect 
(tell) 
   
Cooperate (withhold) 1/1 3/0 
Defect (tell) 0/3 2/2 
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Column cheats and sends goods of lesser quality, he will make three and 
Row will make zero.  However, Row will end their relationship and 
Column will have to look for other cooperative partners.  A similar result 
would occur if Row cheats—for example, by challenging the quality of 
adequate goods and withholding full payment.  Assuming a desire to play 
for a number of times, it is better for the parties to cooperate than to 
sever their ties, because making two regularly is better than making three 
a few times, while also developing a reputation for being untrustworthy, 
and thus losing future cooperative opportunities.  As Professor Eric 
Posner has pointed out, “logic shows that the optimal move is always to 
cooperate.”161  Norms are, in turn, artifacts of the long term cooperation 
of these rational individuals. 
2. Deficiencies in the Game-Theoretic Model of Norms 
The game-theoretic model of norm formation is, of course, 
extremely parsimonious.  In particular, it does little to identify 
specifically the way in which individual beliefs or preferences can be 
linked to the behavioral standards embodied by norms.  Nor does the 
game-theoretic model provide an understanding of why individuals 
comply with norms.  Our expressive theory uses the concept of need-
reinforcement in conjunction with the basic social psychology of norms 
and groups to inform the rational choice model and, in particular, provide 
an understanding of these issues.  By identifying norms as reflections of 
aggregate preference and normative behavior as a signal of the 
importance of group standing to an individual, the model provides a 
framework for considering how estimations of group preference inform 
and affect behavior. 
This model leads to a particular view of groups and norms.  
Pursuant to the rational choice perspective, groups are the result of 
individuals coming together for the mutual satisfaction of their own 
needs.162  The individual is the basic unit of such a conception of the 
group,163 and interdependence is the basic force that holds these 
 
 161. Id. at 16 (Posner also suggests that the logic of cooperation extends to games 
involving more than two players by assuming that everyone has sufficient information 
about other people’s past activities.  Thus, defection from one pairwise transaction will 
not lead to a “clean slate” in the next pairwise transaction.). 
 162. See, e.g., MUZAFER SHERIF, GROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: THEIR SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1966) (illustrating how shared identity and group organization arise as 
derivative phenomena from interdependence between group members). 
 163. FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1924) (This concept has its roots 
in some of the earliest work of social psychology.  As early as 1924, psychologists 
argued that the individual was the only psychological reality and that there was nothing in 
the group that was not in the individual.). 
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individuals together.164  In this sense, the group is simply a reflection, or 
aggregation, of the individuals that comprise it, and the idea of a group 
as something other than a collection of individuals is meaningless.165  
The idea of a social norm within this framework is, in turn, simply the 
reflection of the aggregate preferences of the individuals that comprise 
the group.166  That is, norms are the reflection of the perceived majority 
position of any group of individuals and can be determined by simply 
combining the individual positions of the majority of group members.167 
It is difficult, however, to reconcile this view of normative 
behavioral standards with the notion that normative behavior provides 
information as to one’s willingness to cooperate with other group 
members.  The connection between certain moral norms, such as “do 
unto others as they would do unto you” and one’s cooperativeness is 
apparent.  It becomes more difficult to see the relationship between other 
norms—for instance, eating hot dogs at a baseball game—and one’s 
cooperative nature.168  Posner has attempted to solve this problem by 
describing norms as behavioral equilibria that result from people 
signaling their discount rates to one another.169  He suggests that 
preferences regarding the value of future payoffs differ among the 
population.170  Thus, people with low discount rates are less likely to 
defect from a cooperation game because they value future payoffs higher 
than most.  Posner deems such people “good types.”171  In order to 
distinguish themselves from bad types, good types engage in behaviors 
that signal their higher discount rate.172  Because they value future 
payoffs more highly, good types are willing to undertake more expensive 
signaling behaviors.173  Norms, to Posner, are the behavioral equilibria 
 
 164. John C. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive 
Theory of Group Behavior, 2 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 77, 79 (1985) [hereinafter 
Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept]. 
 165. See FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 260 (1924) (arguing that the 
individual is the only psychological reality and that there is nothing in the group that is 
not in the individual). 
 166. See Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept, supra note 164, at 80. 
 167. Id. at 82. 
 168. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms and 
Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 676-78 [hereinafter McAdams, Signaling 
Discount Rates] (reviewing LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS by Eric A. Posner) (McAdams 
asserts that it would be inefficient for all of these behaviors to act as signals of 
cooperativeness.  Instead, he suggests, the most efficient way to create a reputation for 
cooperativeness is, simply, to cooperate with others.). 
 169. POSNER, supra note 160, at 19-23. 
 170. Id. at 18. 
 171. Id. at 19. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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that result from good and bad types signaling their discount rates.174 
While Posner’s effort continues to be the most comprehensive attempt to 
explain norm formation, and, in particular, to explain the normative basis 
for a number of specific behaviors, it has been subject to criticism.175 
3. The Social-Psychological Model of Norms 
The social-psychological model provides a simpler explanation of 
how abiding by norms reflects an individual’s cooperativeness.  The 
explanation is grounded in the mutual attraction that arises between 
individuals who are interdependent.176  This attraction is rooted in the 
operation of a need satisfaction or “reinforcement” principle:  mutual 
liking between group members reflects the extent to which positive, 
gratifying, or rewarding outcomes are associated directly or indirectly 
with being in a cooperative relationship with each other.177  The greater 
the perceived rewards of group membership, the greater the attraction to 
the group and the less likelihood of defection.178 
Normative pressure is, in turn, an external force that affects an 
individual’s behavior only to the extent that she is concerned about 
others to whom she is attracted.179  Put simply, if an individual wants to 
do something she perceives is not condoned by other group members, 
and there is a sense of mutual liking or attraction between her and the 
other group members, she risks disapproval from others to whom she is 
attracted.180  A group member that seeks esteem is thus required to 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, Commentaries on Eric Posner’s Law and Social 
Norms: Cyberian Signals, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 327, 359 (2002) (“Posner errs, then, by 
using signaling of discount rates as the sole explanation for norms.”); Dan M. Kahan, 
Commentaries on Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms: Signaling or Reciprocating? A 
Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 371 (2002) 
(stating that “Posner’s signaling model, as it stands . . . should not be trusted to guide 
public policy even provisionally for four distinct reasons”); see also McAdams, Signaling 
Discount Rates, supra note 168. 
 176. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept, supra note 164 at 121. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Rational choice scholars intuitively understand this attraction. See, e.g., Robert 
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized 
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1592-93 (2000) (“Business, politics, love, and war cause 
people to form relationships with each other.  These relationships create opportunities for 
mutual benefit from cooperation and also opportunities for people to exploit each 
other.”). 
 180. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION THEORY 20 (1987).  “[W]here people perceive, believe or expect to 
achieve mutual satisfaction from their association, they will tend to associate in a solitary 
fashion, to develop positive interpersonal attitudes and to influence each other’s attitudes 
and behavior on the basis of their power to satisfy needs for information and reward each 
other.”  Id. 
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estimate which behaviors are approved by other group members.181  The 
more uniformly held and highly valued the preference, the more likely it 
will assert normative force.182 
Returning to the example of individual attitude toward seatbelt use, 
consider two different possible levels of belief regarding the norm.  In 
one case imagine that the individual believes that most of the group 
(about 90%) approves of seatbelt use, and, in the other, she believes only 
a small majority of the group (say 60%) approves of seatbelt use.  
Depending on her own beliefs regarding seatbelt use, this difference may 
have an impact on her willingness to undertake the practice. 
These differences can be measured in terms of their impacts on 
expected utility.  Recall that the individual may evaluate the procedure 
both positively, as providing greater safety, and negatively, as reducing 
comfort and mobility.  Assume that only these two beliefs and a belief 
regarding the subjective norm are relevant to the behavior.  Assume 
further that beliefs about the behavior are held constant—the individual 
prefers not to use seatbelts, but does not hold this preference very 
strongly (as set forth above, -900 units).  The certainty with which she 
holds beliefs about the norm will thus determine her willingness to 
undertake the behavior.  Consider the effect on utility in the situation 
when certainty of belief regarding the subjective norm drops from 95 to 
30, as set forth in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Belief Certainty Evaluation Be 
Will be socially approved +95 +10   +950 
Protects me in accidents +30 +90 +2700 
Restricts movement 
Is uncomfortable 
+40 
+40 
 -40 
-50 
 -1600 
 -2000 
  Ao = Σ biei  +50 
 
 
 181. Scott, Robert, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 
VA. L. REV., 1603, 1615 (2000) (discussing the Baysian nature of normative reasoning). 
 182. Id. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
Because the individual’s understanding of the uniformity with which a 
belief is held (+30 versus +95) impacts her estimation of normative 
sanction, she will feel constrained to act by normative control in the 
former case (because the utility is +50) and not constrained in the latter 
(where the utility is -600). 
Now, consider that the individual member values group 
membership much more strongly.  Thus, her negative evaluation of the 
normative consequences of acting out of step with group attitudes will be 
much more substantial (assuming an evaluation for this example of -50).  
This evaluation will result in conformity regarding a much larger number 
of behaviors, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 
 
Belief Certainty Evaluation Be 
Will be socially approved +30 +50 +1500 
Protects me in accidents +30 +90 +2700 
Restricts movement 
Is uncomfortable 
+40 
+40 
 -40 
-50 
 -1600 
 -2000 
  Ao = Σ biei   +600 
 
In such a case, even a small perceived certainty (+30) of sanction will 
result in conformity. 
The more an individual conforms to perceived group norms, the 
more likely other group members are to perceive her to be strongly 
attracted to the group.  Her willingness to abide by group norms reflects 
her deep value of acceptance by the community.  This is particularly the 
case when individuals exhibit group conformity with less certain norms 
that are not universally held.  This commitment to group membership 
acts as a strong signal of the emerging individual’s unwillingness to 
defect from cooperative endeavors with other group members. 
The need-reinforcement addition to the basic rational choice model 
Belief Certainty Evaluation Be 
Will be socially approved +30 +10   +300 
Protects me in accidents +30 +90 +2700 
Restricts movement 
Is uncomfortable 
+40 
+40 
 -40 
-50 
        -1600 
-2000 
  Ao = Σ biei   -600 
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of behavior thus establishes a very particular view of group and norm 
formation with the rational individual at its core.  Norms arise only 
because rational individuals attain benefits from interacting with others, 
and thus develop a free-standing desire for others’ acceptance.183 
Individuals attempt to determine the preferences of the majority, and 
failure to act in accordance with the view of others negatively impacts 
one’s perceived attractiveness to other group members.184  The higher 
one values group membership, the less likely she is to defect from 
cooperative endeavors.185 
The need-reinforcement principle provides a basis for including in 
the model of expressive effects of law a separate preference for esteem 
from others.186  The reasoned action model describes this desire for 
esteem as the subjective norm.187  The desire for esteem will join other 
preferences that underlie an individual’s attitude to determine the utility 
of any particular behavior.188  This comprehensive model will allow us to 
analyze the way in which government behavior affects individual 
calculations of the utility of acting in accordance with religious 
preferences. 
IV. Application of the Expressive Theory to Government Actions with 
Religious Implications 
The relationship among government, individuals, and community is 
complex and difficult to capture in any comprehensive way.  When 
government acts, such as approving the exhibition of a crèche or 
Christmas tree on public property, have religious implications exactly 
how do such actions affect an individual’s understanding of her 
relationship to her community?189  This section applies the expressive 
 
 183. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept, supra note 164. 
 184. Scott, supra note 181. 
 185. See Figures 5 & 6 in III.C.3. and accompanying text. 
 186. See Figure 1 in III.A. and accompanying text; see also note 122. 
 187. See note 142 and related text. 
 188. Id. 
 189. We should note that government behavior may also directly affect perceptions of 
one’s access to government.  For example, when a city places a crèche on its property, 
such an act may lead an individual to infer that the city officials self-identify as 
Christians.  As we will discuss, there will be situations where government acts influence 
individual beliefs either through direct information provision or reasonable inferences of 
one’s ability to interact with government.  Infra Section IV.A.2.a.  Lack of a fully-
realized expressive theory, however, has led the court to fuse concerns about one’s 
relationship to community and government—this is particularly apparent in Justice 
O’Connor’s notion that government acts affect one’s beliefs about standing in “political 
community.”  As we will discuss, perceptions of one’s relationship to community is often 
mediated through the fact that government is perceived to represent the majority. 
However, the message sent about community often also carries with it a message about 
government itself.  To the extent the message is one of limited access, we will argue that 
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theory described above to answer these questions.  This article also 
seeks, by the end of this section, to set out a framework of how 
government action results in expressive harms on which a consistent 
analysis of alleged Establishment Clause violations can be based. 
A. The Connection Between Government Acts and Individual Beliefs 
About Access to Government and the Subjective Norm 
Our expressive theory suggests that government acts can carry 
information through either direct or inferential mechanisms.  This 
information can affect individual beliefs regarding the preferences of 
government, as well as affect beliefs about what individuals in the 
community prefer—that is, it can provide information on the subjective 
norm.  When government acts to affect beliefs about the subjective norm, 
this, in turn, will affect calculations of the expected utility of acting in a 
way that contradicts normative belief.  Finally, because the process by 
which information is carried will often be one of inference rather than 
direct information provision, the way in which pre-existing beliefs will 
impact ultimate beliefs about community and group sentiment is 
considered. 
1. Some Preliminary Thoughts 
a. Must the Act Affect Behavior or Belief? 
Our analysis begins by considering the way individuals gather 
information regarding government and community beliefs as a result of 
government action.  Before beginning, however, one or two divisions in 
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence must be 
pointed out, as they will inform the structure of the analysis.  First, the 
Court is divided as to whether a violation of the Establishment Clause 
requires a government act to simply affect beliefs, or whether the act 
must coerce individuals to behave contrary to their religious beliefs or in 
accordance with the privileged religious belief.  Second, if affect on 
belief is enough to form the basis for an Establishment Clause violation, 
the question becomes belief about what—one’s relationship to 
government or one’s relationship to community?  This article comments 
briefly on this jurisprudential division here and will continue to address 
these competing theories where necessary in the exposition of the 
expressive model. 
The Court’s jurisprudence diverges between those who find a 
 
such behavior violates the Establishment Clause.  See infra Section IV.B. 
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violation when a government act affects beliefs and those who require 
the act to be coercive.  In analyzing whether acts violate the 
Establishment Clause, advocates of the endorsement test generally 
review government acts for their affects on belief.190  Thus, under the 
endorsement test, government acts can run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause simply by sending the wrong message to members of the political 
community. 
Other Justices, however, do not believe that effects on one’s belief 
alone rise to the level of an Establishment Clause violation.191  These 
Justices would require that the government act be directly coercive 
before finding an Establishment Clause violation.192  Thus, those who 
apply a test of coercion will only find an Establishment Clause violation 
 
 190. As Justice O’Connor writes: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a 
religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.  
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways.  One is 
excessive entanglement with religious institutions. . . .  The second, and more 
direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion.  
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.  
Disapproval sends the opposite message. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See also 
Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citations omitted). 
([B]ecause our concern is with the political community writ large, the 
endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or 
saving isolated nonadherents from . . . discomfort. . . .  It is for this reason that 
the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of 
the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious 
[speech takes place].). 
See also Bd. of Educ., Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Absent the most unusual circumstances, one’s religion 
ought not affect one’s legal rights or duties or benefits.  As I have previously noted, ‘the 
Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to religion 
relevant to a person’s standing in the political community.’”). 
 191. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992),  Justice Scalia was joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, White, and Thomas.  Id. at 631-46. 
 192. As Justice Scalia has written: 
Thus, while I have no quarrel with the Court’s general proposition that the 
Establishment Clause “guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise,” . . . I see no warrant for 
expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty—a 
brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us who have 
made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.  The 
Framers were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship by the National 
Government; but, as their own sponsorship of nonsectarian prayer in public 
events demonstrates, they understood that “speech is not coercive; the listener 
may do as he likes.” 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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when the government does more than speak.  Generally, they will find 
such a violation only when the government creates a monetary or other 
penalty for religious behavior. 
b. Are Beliefs About One’s Standing in Community, One’s 
Access to Government, or Both Relevant to the Expressive Inquiry? 
The second difference which must be considered in developing an 
expressive Establishment Clause theory concerns the uncertainty in 
current jurisprudence between government and community.  Assuming, 
as advocates of the endorsement test do, that effects on belief are enough 
to violate the Establishment Clause, the requisite effect on belief is still 
unclear.  In particular, endorsement test advocates are not clear whether a 
government act must affect beliefs about one’s relationship to 
government or to one’s community to violate the Establishment Clause.  
Rather, these Justices speak in terms of the government act affecting 
one’s belief about connection to “political community.”193  The language 
seems to suggest something more than just relationship to government, 
but, at the same time, suggests that “community” interest is somehow 
circumscribed by politics. 
Similar uncertainty exists within the coercion jurisprudence.  While 
most of the Justices that apply the coercion test seem to support Justice 
Scalia’s notion that, to be coercive, the act must carry a penalty, Justice 
Kennedy has written that coercion need not be the result of direct 
sanction only.194  He has recognized that coercion can occur as a result of 
social pressure to conform.195  That is, a government’s act can affect 
behavior through the indirect means of community pressure, and not just 
from a direct sanction such as a fine.196  Justice Scalia takes issue with 
this reasoning.197  He believes that the “deeper flaw” in the Court’s 
opinion is that an Establishment Clause violation hinges on the “precious 
question” of “whether there was state-induced ‘peer-pressure’ 
coercion.”198  In any case, the question of whether a government act can 
 
 193. Justice O’Connor referred to “political community” in several of her opinions; in 
Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), she was joined by Justices Souter and 
Breyer.  Id. at 779-80. 
 194. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593-94. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Justice Kennedy, in Lee v. Weisman, said “[t]he undeniable fact is that the school 
district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public 
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, 
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.  This pressure, though 
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”  Id. at 593. 
 197. See id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 198. Id. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The deeper flaw in the Court’s opinion does not lie in its wrong answer to the 
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be coercive as a result of social pressure has led at least one proponent of 
the test to suggest that behavior mediated through social mechanisms can 
violate the Establishment Clause. 
This uncertain jurisprudence poses important issues for any 
expressive framework.  In developing our framework, the moving targets 
created by these competing theories are addressed.  Ultimately, this 
article argues that the court must treat beliefs about access to government 
as distinct from beliefs about fitting into community, as these different 
beliefs reflect two distinct cognitive processes, and some Establishment 
Clause cases reflect concerns regarding only one of these relevant 
mechanisms.  Additionally, this article concludes that acts that affect 
either of these beliefs violate the Establishment Clause. 
We also hope to shed light on the relationship between belief and 
coercion.  Generally, we argue that when normative belief changes, such 
a change becomes coercive in the sense that it changes the expected 
utility of acting in accordance with one’s religious beliefs.  On the other 
hand, not all changes in normative belief will actually change behavior.  
With these issues in mind, we can now apply the expressive theory to 
Establishment Clause cases. 
2. How Government Acts Affect Beliefs About Access to 
Government and the Subjective Norm 
a. Government Acts and Beliefs About Community Sentiment 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is concerned with the 
relationship between government acts and beliefs about one’s 
relationship to community,199 with the focus on the ways government 
actions may affect the subjective norm.200  As a general matter, this can 
happen through any process where the religious symbol displayed by the 
 
question whether there was state-induced “peer-pressure” coercion; it lies, 
rather, in the Court’s making violation of the Establishment Clause hinge on 
such a precious question.  The coercion that was a hallmark of historical 
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial 
support by force of law and threat of penalty.  Typically, attendance as the state 
church was required; only clergy of the official church could lawfully perform 
sacraments; and, dissenters, if tolerated, faced an array of civil disabilities.  
Thus, for example, in the Colony of Virginia, where the Church of England had 
been established, ministers were required by law to conform to the doctrine and 
rites of the Church of England; and all persons were required to attend church 
and observe the Sabbath, were tithed for the public support of Anglican 
ministers, and were taxed for the costs of building and repairing churches. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 199. Schragger, supra note 121, at 1847-77. 
 200. See supra Section III.C.3. (discussing the subjective norm). 
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government serves to provide information on the beliefs of the 
community.  Returning to the discussion of information provision,201 two 
very specific means through which this information is carried can be 
identified:  direct information provision—for example, through 
statements made about the religious symbol—or inferential processes. 
Let’s return to our crèche example.  When a crèche is displayed on 
public property, it is possible that a person will receive direct information 
on community sentiment and/or infer from the display the community’s 
sentiment202 about Christianity.  In the case of direct information, one 
may simply hear from other community members how they feel about 
the crèche.  In this sense, the information on belief is transmitted directly 
by the community members, and the crèche is simply the trigger for such 
communication.  If, for example, one hears a number of neighbors 
making very laudable comments about the display, and none suggesting 
it is bad, one may conclude from such comments that members of the 
community value Christian beliefs.  Similarly, if the local newspaper 
carries a story reporting the positive reception of the symbol, or, if the 
symbol becomes the focus of a community celebration, one may also 
conclude that the community generally values Christian beliefs. 
On the other hand, the crèche may actually serve as the source of 
information on community sentiment through the process of inference.  
Indeed, this is the likely mechanism by which government behavior will 
provide information on community sentiment.203  The key to 
understanding how government acts may result in inferences about 
community sentiment lies in the fact that people equate government acts 
with the desires of the majority of the populace the government 
serves204—that is, people generally believe government serves the 
majority.  In the crèche example, the observer may reason that:  
1) government serves the interests of the majority; 2) the display is of a 
Christian image; and 3) thus the majority of the community values 
Christian beliefs.  In such cases, a person will draw information on 
majority belief from a government act specifically because the 
government is supposed to represent the beliefs of the community.  
Compare this to a situation where a private individual displays a crèche 
on his or her front yard.  In such a case it may be easy to infer that the 
 
 201. See supra Section III.B.1. 
 202. We, of course, do not mean to suggest in this case that a “community” can have 
its own sentiment.  Rather, in keeping with rational choice models of groups, here we 
simply mean that the majority of community prefers Christianity. 
 203. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 204. See Geisinger, supra note 129, at 69-71; see generally Yural Feldman and Janice 
Nadler, The Law & Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577 (2006); Richard H. 
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000). 
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individual values Christian beliefs, but the individual’s acts do not 
directly implicate the beliefs of the majority or even others in the 
community.205 
Specifically in terms of the expressive model, the new inferential or 
direct information affects belief certainty regarding the subjective 
norm.206  Returning to the model, recall that belief certainty reflects the 
likelihood that a particular consequence of a behavior will occur.207  The 
subjective norm, in turn, is one’s subjective perception of the aggregate 
preferences of individuals within the community.208  The more certain 
one is that the preference is held strongly and by a large number of 
community members, the more certain one is that acting against that 
preference will not receive community esteem. A change in the 
subjective norm will also affect the expected utility of acting in 
accordance with one’s religious beliefs.  Figure 7 diagrams this effect 
regarding the willingness of a Jewish man to wear a yarmulke. 
 
 205. Richard H. McAdams has recognized one significant limitation to this 
inferential mechanism.  Drawing from the findings of public choice theory, he argues that 
many individuals now believe that government serves the interests of concentrated capital 
and not the majority of voters.  Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of 
Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 360-61 (2000).  While this may be the case, it is 
likely that local government is less captured by concentrated capital, and this concern will 
not be as relevant in local political arenas. Id.  Also, while many people may see 
government as captured by special interests, not all people do.  Indeed, it is likely that 
many people still equate government with majority will.  McAdams recognizes this 
possibility and suggests that a “soft form” of public interest belief exists where 
individuals have concerns about concentrated capital, but still believe in some amount of 
majority representation. Id. at 361-62.  Our framework recognizes this limitation and 
suggests that inferences of community norms will only exist in conditions where 
observers connect government acts to majority beliefs. 
Note one interesting inferential variation on this observation. One may, as Robert Cooter 
suggests, consciously pursue the cooperative opportunities that most benefit him or 
herself. See generally, Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-
Control and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 
(1998).  Obviously, people with wealth are quite likely the “best” cooperative partners 
because they have the most resources with which to engage in cooperative endeavors.  
Thus, if one believes that wealth “controls” government behavior, he or she may infer 
from displays of majority religious images that the best cooperative partners prefer a 
certain religion, and thus be affected not because the majority of community members’ 
beliefs are reflected by the government’s behavior, but because the majority of 
cooperative power is reflected by government.  This would change behavior at a very 
conscious level in situations where one sought to cooperate with the power elite. 
 206. See Sections III.A. and III.B 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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Figure 7 
 
Belief Certainty Evaluation Be 
    
Wearing a Yarmulke satisfies  
religious obligations +80 +50 +4000 
    
Will decrease esteem +30 -60 -1800 
  Ao = Σ biei +2200 
 
After Information Changes Belief About Community Preference 
(i.e., the Subjective Norm): 
 
Belief Certainty Evaluation Be 
    
Wearing a Yarmulke  
satisfies religious obligations +80 +50 +4000 
    
Will decrease esteem +40 -60 -2400 
  Ao = Σ biei +1600 
 
In this example, the change in the subjective norm did not change 
the behavior it only decreased its utility.  There may be other religious 
behaviors that are not as highly valued as wearing a Yarmulke, for which 
this particular change in normative certainty would also change behavior.  
Of course, there will also be people who value social esteem more highly 
for whom even a slight change in certainty regarding the subjective norm 
will also change utility enough so as to change behavior.  The 
implications of this observation are discussed further in Section V.209  
Now, it is enough to have demonstrated that government behaviors 
actually affect individuals’ understanding of the social norm. 
b. Beliefs About Access to Government:  Government as a 
Cooperative Partner 
Behind the desire for esteem is a recognition that being a group 
member provides cooperative benefits.  While the desire for esteem is 
built on the general attraction individuals develop to other group 
members with whom they achieve cooperative goals, there are cases 
where individuals consciously recognize their dependence on a particular 
 
 209. See infra Section V. 
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individual to achieve their goals.210  One of these cases is when the 
cooperative partner is the government.  Government is different than 
many other cooperative partners in that it has monopoly power over a 
number of benefits that individuals may seek.  Only with government 
approval can one get permission to build on or change the use of 
property, post signs, or even drive a car.211  In this sense, government is 
not just another potential cooperator, but a privileged and powerful one. 
Many Establishment Clause cases reflect a relatively simple 
understanding of this concept.212  When the government acts, sometimes 
the act provides information about what group(s) the government favors.  
Intuitively individuals know that a government display of a religious 
symbol can make one feel, as Justice O’Connor has described it, like an 
“insider” or “outsider”—part of the group or not.213  This feeling, 
however, is not the result of the act providing direct information 
regarding who government favors. Rather, the act—like all other acts—is 
filtered through the same mechanism individuals use to ascertain the 
preferences of others.214  By ascertaining the aggregate preferences of 
others, individuals can make determinations about what behaviors the 
group prefers and, knowing these behaviors, they can choose to act in 
accordance with group preference or against it.215 
Put another way, to know aggregate preference, one must figure out 
individuals’ preferences.  When one knows what the majority of the 
group prefers, her attraction to the group will lead her to feel pressure to 
act similarly.  In the case of government, a similar mechanism is at work.  
However, individuals are interested in ascertaining the aggregate 
preferences only of government employees and not all members of 
society.  Such understanding will influence one’s belief regarding the 
willingness of government to cooperate with her.  The intuition is clearly 
one of individuals being insiders or outsiders, but the source of the 
intuition falls back on individuals’ understanding of the importance of 
showing that they value members of the group by acting in conformity 
with the groups norms.216 
 
 210. See Cooter, supra note 205, at 922 (arguing that we act in accordance with 
norms because of an awareness that doing so will provide us with cooperative 
opportunities and other benefits). 
 211. Of course this monopoly power is subject to some limitations.  One may be 
entitled to build on or use her property a particular way because the law provides for such 
use.  There are, however, at best a limited number of cases where government discretion 
is not permitted. 
 212. See Sections III.A-B. 
 213. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 214. For a general discussion of the subjective norm, see Section III.B.3.  For a 
discussion of the different forms of belief, see Section III.B.1. 
 215. See Section III.B.3. 
 216. See supra Section III.C (for a more complete discussion of this phenomenon.) 
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Let’s return to the example of a Jewish man who wants to determine 
whether he should wear a Yarmulke.  In addition to his concerns about 
standing in the community, he may expect that one day he will have to 
go to city hall to get a building permit or for some other government 
service.  He must determine whether the people he will encounter in city 
hall will likely cooperate with him or not.217  The process he follows in 
making this determination is the same as in any other case.218  He must 
either get direct or inferential information on the individuals’ 
preferences. 
Note, however, that there are some differences in the government 
and community preference analysis.  The main difference concerns the 
inferential mechanism utilized.  In the case of providing community 
information, the government act is a signal because of preexisting beliefs 
that government represents the preferences of the community.  In the 
case of providing information on government preference, the government 
act directly relates to the beliefs of the actor.  That is, an individual may 
infer from the fact that government officials display a particular symbol, 
that such officials generally believe in the symbol’s meaning.  In this 
sense, the government display is exactly like a private display.  When 
one passes by a house decorated for Christmas, it is likely that one would 
infer that the residents are Christian and thus prefer Christian values.219 
Under the expressive theory, a government act that provides direct 
 
 217. Note that there is a strong connection between community standing and access to 
government in situations where government employees are also members of the 
community.  A Yarmulke worn in the community will be equally visible to government 
employees in the community as to other community members.  Thus, a Jewish man, in 
this situation, will be concerned about wearing a Yarmulke in town as well as when he 
goes to city hall. 
 218. Note that there is a strong connection between community standing and access to 
government, especially when individuals who work in government also live in the 
community.  However, these two are not the same.  As we will discuss, the process of 
gathering information about government is different than about the community. 
 219. One may object that it is irrational to infer a preference of an individual in 
government based on an act that the individual did not influence in any way.  For 
example, why should someone assume the preferences of a member of the zoning 
commission from the decision to display a crèche made by the mayor?  In a world of 
perfect information and rational thought this may be a valid complaint.  However, it is 
quite clear that people do not process information in the way this would suggest.  For 
example, certain heuristics may affect our understanding of government employee belief.  
The representativeness and availability heuristics suggest that a mayor or other visible 
and representative figure may affect our perceptions of government employee’s beliefs.  
See Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use 
of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (2005).  Even absent the 
influence of heuristics, people may simply believe that government employees are 
beholden to those who appoint them or lead them and will thus act in accordance with 
elected officials’ desires.  The existence of the crèche will, in turn, provide a basis for 
inferring the officials’ desires. 
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information, or reasonably influences one’s inferences220 of his or her 
access to government, would violate the Establishment Clause.  The 
main basis for this argument concerns the monopolistic nature and power 
of government.  Consider an individual in a community comprised of 
different attitudes.  While the individual may not find an optimal 
cooperative relationship with any one person, the variety of perspectives 
and competition for cooperation will likely ensure some ability to find 
and work with others.  Government is an economically powerful 
individual actor with whom individuals must cooperate to attain certain 
goals.221  Well-developed notions of equal protection suggest that 
government is required to treat all people equally.222  Consequently, 
when government acts to demonstrate favoritism toward one religious 
group, these notions of equal protection are violated.223 
 
 220. As we will discuss more completely below, pre-existing beliefs matter.  If, for 
example, a government official has made numerous previous statements about a need to 
accommodate Jewish beliefs in government, but has also stated a dislike for Muslims, a 
reasonable Muslim may well infer from a display of a crèche and a menorah that he or 
she is not a preferred member of the community.  If, however, the government is 
comprised of Muslims and has frequently stated the importance of accommodating Jews 
and Christians, it may be more difficult for the person to reasonably infer from the 
behavior that he or she is not a preferred member of society.  This is not to say that the 
government behavior does not violate the Establishment Clause.  In a world of limited 
resources, it is, of course, fair to assume that efforts to accommodate one group will leave 
less resources available to accommodate another.  The key is to understand that pre-
existing beliefs influence inferences, and thus must be considered in determining whether 
a government display actually influences perceptions of government’s willingness to 
cooperate with certain groups of individuals. 
 221. See supra Section III. 
 222. See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).  Plaintiffs 
claimed the Village conditioned their access to water service on their granting the Village 
a 33-foot easement, while others had to grant only a 15-foot easement, because they had 
filed an unrelated, unsuccessful lawsuit against the Village stated a claim for relief based 
on traditional equal protection analysis.  Id. at 563.  “Our cases have recognized 
successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges 
that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”  Id. at 564.  See also Ry. 
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that 
there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which 
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.  
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to 
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will 
apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be 
visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.  Courts can take no 
better measure to assure that law will be just than to require that laws be 
equal in operation. 
Id. 
 223. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (holding a statute, which 
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i. The Importance of Pre-existing Belief 
The fact that government behavior will generally work through 
inferential mechanisms to influence belief-certainty requires 
consideration of the pre-existing beliefs from which these inferences 
flow.  Remember from the earlier discussion of inference that, as a 
general matter, inference is guided by logical processes and the need for 
evaluative consistency.224  Thus, to the extent one has a certain set of 
beliefs, such beliefs will greatly influence inferences drawn from any 
government behavior. 
Consider two people in two different communities.  In one 
community, Jane has heard time and again from many sources that town 
officials are strong advocates of Christian ideals.  Indeed, the mayor 
regularly commented in his campaign about the importance of his 
Christian beliefs as to how he will govern.  The town itself also has many 
private sources of information regarding the community’s Christian 
nature.  Jane also has a rudimentary understanding of existing law and 
knows that the display of Christian images alone on government property 
is generally violative of the Establishment Clause. 
Jim, on the other hand, is a member of a diverse community 
comprised primarily of Muslims and Hindus with a number of other 
religions, such as Judaism and Christianity, represented in much smaller 
numbers.  Now assume that the government displays a crèche and a 
Hanukkah Menorah on public property in both communities.  In the first 
community, Jane is likely not to see the display of these symbols as 
 
limited tax exempt status to those religious organizations that received more than half of 
their total contributions from members or affiliated organizations, unconstitutional).  
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination 
cannot be officially preferred over another,” id. at 244, and “[f]ree exercise thus can be 
guaranteed only when legislators—and voters—are required to accord to their own 
religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations,” id. 
at 245.  See also Bd. of Educ., Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 
702 (1994) (expressing concern about whether the state legislature, which created a 
separate school district for the Satmar community, would provide that same benefit 
equally to other religious and non-religious groups).  In one Free Exercise case, the Court 
was willing to tolerate the fact that politically connected religions will obtain 
accommodations that other religions will not.  See Employment Div., Dept. of Human 
Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (recognizing that “leaving 
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those 
religious practices that are not widely engaged in,” but concluding that is an “unavoidable 
consequence of democratic government”).  However, in another Free Exercise case, 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the 
Court held that ordinances prohibiting religious animal sacrifice that were aimed at the 
Santeria worship service (i.e. their goal was suppression of religion) were 
unconstitutional because they could not satisfy strict scrutiny.  Id. at 546-47.  In contrast 
to the situation in Smith, these ordinances were not laws of general applicability.  See id. 
 224. See infra Section III.B. 
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indicative of government’s embrace of a plurality of religion or even 
Judaism.  Rather, belief and evaluative consistency will likely lead Jane 
to assume that the government primarily wants to display a Christian 
symbol, but is coerced by the law to display another symbol as well.  
Jim, on the other hand, may see the government effort as reflecting a 
desire of elected officials to embrace or reach out to the minority groups 
within the community.225 
The point, of course, is that different pre-existing beliefs lead to 
different inferences.  This observation may, at first, seem daunting; the 
number of different pre-existing beliefs can lead to a virtually limitless 
number of different inferences to be drawn from any particular 
government act.  If such a result is the case, then developing an 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence will be impossible because each case 
will stand on its own.226  This sense of futility is, however, misplaced.  
The existence of a framework for analysis of Establishment Clause 
violations provides exactly the type of guidance that the courts need for 
undertaking an analysis of the expressive effects of government 
behavior.  Courts will still be left to consider individual facts, but will be 
able to place such facts in a coherent framework for consideration. 
There are two specific issues that must be addressed in analyzing 
inferences in Establishment Clause cases.  The first concerns whether the 
pre-existing belief is legally valid.  The second concerns whether the 
inference drawn from a government act with religious implications is 
reasonably drawn from these legally valid beliefs.  Ultimately, under the 
expressive theory, the Establishment Clause is violated if a government 
act provides information or leads to reasonable inferences drawn from 
legally valid pre-existing beliefs that an individual is favored or 
disfavored by government, or in the community, as a result of his or her 
religious beliefs. 
At the core of each case will be a particular government act in a 
particular community.  This will serve to narrow the potential for 
considering pre-existing beliefs a great deal.  One of the keys to judicial 
analysis will be to consider what the pre-existing beliefs of the plaintiffs 
are and whether or not the beliefs are well-founded and legally valid.  If 
individuals testify to the basis for their beliefs and inferences, these 
sources can be tested.  For example, one may be able to root his or her 
belief in such factors as the number of religious institutions in the town, 
media reports regarding religious matters or institutions, and the 
 
 225. Note that if Jim is of a majority religious faith in the community—say he is 
Muslim—he may still believe that his access to government has been decreased.  See 
supra Section IV.A. 
 226. See generally Cole, supra note 121, at 564 (noting that the endorsement test, as 
applied by the Court, is vague and indeterminate); Hill, supra note 121, at 492-93. 
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prevalence of discussions or private displays of religious images.  The 
existence of these factors can be established relatively easily. 
Similarly, which of these beliefs are given legal validity could also 
be addressed.  Thus, if one individual believed that Jews like clean 
streets, and thus challenged government street sweeping as a violation of 
the Establishment Clause because it showed a preference for Jews, a 
court could consider whether that individual’s underlying belief, even if 
sincerely held, is valid or not valid, as it is not based in any particular 
Jewish doctrine.  Note that this analysis does not require a court to 
determine the truth or falsity of a person’s religious beliefs or doctrines 
because the court is asking whether one individual’s assessment of a 
religious group’s preference related to the condition of streets is in fact 
accurate.227 
Another issue concerns whether the expressive analysis should be 
based on actual pre-existing beliefs or on the beliefs of a representative, 
well-informed community member.  For example, consider a person who 
lives in a particular town, but only goes downtown a few times a year, 
including once a year during the holiday season, to do some shopping.  
Every year she passes by the main government building downtown and 
sees a live nativity or crèche.  From this, and without any other 
information, she forms a belief regarding the importance of Christian 
beliefs to the community.  Because she is Muslim, this belief makes her 
feel like an outsider and also leads her to not wear her headscarf 
downtown.  Can her limited experience provide the basis for an 
Establishment Clause violation?  On the one hand, one would recognize 
that the government action causes the individual to change her belief 
about the consequences of her actions.  On the other hand, it ignores 
mediating information that is known in the general community. 
 
 227. As a general matter, the Court is willing to look at the sincerity of an asserted 
religious belief, but it will not determine the truth or falsity of the religious belief or 
doctrine.  See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).  However, in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972), the Court was willing to distinguish 
between faith and mode of life, with the latter not rooted in religious belief.  Later, in 
Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t. of Empl. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833-35 (1989), the Court clarified 
Yoder, holding that the support of an “organized religious denomination” is not necessary 
and protecting an individual’s observance of the Sunday Sabbath even though he arrived 
at his belief from his interpretation of the Bible, rather than the tenet or teaching of an 
organized religious body.  See also Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 715-16 (1981) (holding it was beyond the judicial function and competence to 
examine whether Thomas, who argued that his faith precluded him from working in the 
armaments plant making tank turrets, or other Jehovah’s Witnesses, who worked in the 
plant and found it “‘scripturally’ acceptable,” correctly understood the commands of their 
faith).  In the Establishment Clause context, the Court will have to consider the legal 
validity of belief.  Failure to do so would result in inferences of Establishment Clause 
violations for such a wide variety of government acts that government itself would be 
unable to function in a meaningful way. 
GEISINGER.DOC 10/9/2007  2:09:44 PM 
122 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the reasonableness of one’s 
inferences can also be tested.  Using the tools of logic and evaluative 
consistency, one could readily determine whether an inference could be 
drawn reasonably from certain established pre-existing beliefs.  For 
example, if one establishes that he believes his town to be pro-Christian, 
a response to the display of a Hanukkah menorah as a pro-Christian act 
would be difficult to sustain.  Of course, the inference that government is 
somehow privileging Jews might be reasonable in such a case.228 
The expressive model provides a comprehensive framework upon 
which the affects of government acts on individuals of a particular 
religion can be based.  In this sense the expressive model can supplant 
the many different tests currently being used to analyze Establishment 
Clause cases.  Those tests, as we have discussed, reflect a variety of 
different notions on the relationship of government to religion.  Unlike 
those tests, however, the expressive model provides a means for directly 
linking legal determinations to the goal of promoting free exercise of 
religion.  The model ultimately suggests that an Establishment Clause 
violation should, in general, be found when government behaviors make 
individual religious behavior more costly.  Obviously, one may differ 
with regard to how much he or she believes the Establishment Clause is 
intended to promote religious freedom.  We will consider the way in 
which these differing standards may be incorporated into the expressive 
analysis in Section V.  For now we plan to apply our expressive model to 
demonstrate how it would answer a number of issues that currently exist 
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  We hope to demonstrate, in our 
application, that in courts’ analyses of Establishment Clause cases, they 
have often ignored the factors most relevant to determinations of whether 
a government act is impinging on religious freedom.  This is not to say 
that the Supreme Court has decided these cases incorrectly.  Rather, it is 
to demonstrate the importance of properly linking government behavior 
to religious action instead of relying on conclusory assumptions that 
provide little guidance for the resolution of future cases and that are 
ultimately, intuitively unsatisfying. 
B. Application of the Expressive Model to Some Specific Issues in 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence. 
Now that an expressive theory of law for analysis of potential 
Establishment Clause violations has been laid out and described, we will 
apply the theory first to a number of issues that the court has confronted 
 
 228. See supra Section IV.A.3 (discussing the relationship between inferences 
regarding access to government and inferences regarding one’s standing in the 
community). 
GEISINGER.DOC 10/9/2007  2:09:44 PM 
2007] AN EXPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE 123 
in developing its Establishment Clause jurisprudence and then to a 
number of Establishment Clause cases.  What we hope to demonstrate in 
the application is that the expressive theory provides a better method of 
analyzing Establishment Clause issues than existing jurisprudence does.  
In particular, we hope to demonstrate that the Court has generally 
ignored important contextual facts that will, in most cases, play 
significant roles in ultimately determining whether a government’s 
behavior has actually affected an individual’s practice of religion.  When 
the Court ignores such factors, its decisions are often intuitively 
unsatisfying because they do not reflect realistic understandings of the 
effects of government behavior on belief. 
1. Historical Existence of Religious Objects 
One issue in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is how to treat 
religious objects that have long been on public property.  Some courts 
find that such government displays somehow lose their religious 
significance and become, instead, secular or historical, and thus hold that 
they do not violate the Establishment Clause.229  To the extent historical 
existence is a factor, this article argues that it is a factor not because the 
religious significance of the object has somehow been removed, but 
because one who understands that the object has been in a public place 
for some time has less of a basis for inferring that the object represents 
the current beliefs of either the existing government or community.230 
 
 229. See, e.g., Freethought Soc’y of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 
247, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2003), in which the court addressed a challenge to a bronze plaque 
accepted by the County in 1920 and placed on the courthouse façade, where it has 
remained for over eight decades.  The plaintiffs requested removal in 2001.  Id. at 250.  
Reversing a permanent injunction ordering removal of the plaque, the court stated: 
[W]e think that the appropriate focus of our inquiry is on the events of 2001, 
when the Commissioners declined to remove the plaque.  Applying the 
“endorsement test,” we conclude that:  (1) the reasonable observer would be 
aware of the approximate age of the plaque and the fact that the County has 
done nothing since it was erected to highlight or celebrate the plaque; 
(2) because of the plaque’s age and its placement on an historic Courthouse, the 
reasonable observer would believe that the plaque itself is historic; and (3) the 
reasonable observer would not believe that the County’s inaction was 
motivated by a desire to endorse religion, or some religious practice such as 
Sabbatarianism, but rather by a desire to preserve a longstanding plaque.  As 
such, the overall effect of the display, when viewed in the context of its history, 
does not appear to be an endorsement of religion. 
Id. at 251.  See also Modrovich v. Allegheny County, Pa., 385 F.3d 397, 399-400 (3d Cir. 
2004); supra Section II.A.4. 
 230. In his concurring opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), Justice 
Breyer cast the deciding vote in upholding the Texas display of the Ten Commandments 
and discussed the significant fact that “40 years passed in which the presence of the 
monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged (until the single legal objection raised by 
petitioner).”  Id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Noting there was not evidence to suggest 
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However, to suggest that such items can never provide the basis for an 
Establishment Clause claim would be to misunderstand the ways even 
historical images can influence beliefs. 
For example, consider a Ten Commandments sculpture that has 
been in a local courthouse for a long period of time.  Initially, one may 
argue that the primary inferences to be drawn from such an image would 
be that the sculpture reflects an image of early law and is not intended to 
reflect the religious beliefs of the community.  Moreover, to the extent 
the sculpture was erected many years ago, its existence on the courthouse 
steps will provide little information on the current beliefs of people in 
either government or the community. 
This does not, however, end the inquiry.  There may be many ways 
in which the religious symbol provides information on government and 
community.  If, for example, the community is Judeo-Christian and there 
has been recent discussion of the Ten Commandments monument by 
members of the government, the religious preferences of the government 
or the community will likely be evoked by the display.231  Similarly, the 
location of the object either on the periphery or as the focus of a display, 
as well as the nature of the symbol itself, will all affect a determination 
of whether a reasonable person with valid pre-existing beliefs would 
 
this was due to “a climate of intimidation,” he said: 
[T]hose 40 years suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that 
few individuals, whatever their system of beliefs, are likely to have understood 
the monument as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a 
government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote 
religion over nonreligion, to ‘engage in’ any ‘religious practice[e],’ to ‘compel’ 
any ‘religious practice[e],’ or to ‘work deterrence’ of any ‘religious belief.’  
Those 40 years suggest that the public visiting the capitol grounds has 
considered the religious aspect of the tablets’ message as part of what is a 
broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage. 
Id. at 702-03 (citations omitted). 
This analysis misses the point in that it ignores the social pressure on residents not to 
challenge the display.  There is a reason why Establishment Clause challenges to 
religious symbols displayed by government are often brought by organizations, like the 
ACLU, or “Doe” plaintiffs, i.e. social pressure.  Most people find it against their interest 
to publicly challenge such government displays and this is the very reason we believe 
such displays are unconstitutional. 
 231. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285-86 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 
540 U.S. 1000 (2003) (While a judge on a Circuit Court in Alabama, Judge Moore placed 
a plaque depicting the Ten Commandments behind the bench in his courtroom and 
routinely invited clergy to lead prayer at jury organizing events.  He campaigned 
successfully for the position of Chief Justice on the state Supreme Court, during which he 
was referred to as the “Ten Commandments Judge,” and after he was elected, he fulfilled 
his campaign promise by installing the Ten Commandments monument in the rotunda of 
the Alabama State Judicial Building.  At the public unveiling of the monument, Justice 
Moore delivered a speech commemorating the event and indicating its location was 
“fitting and proper” because it would remind judges, attorneys, and visitors “that in order 
to establish justice, we must invoke ‘the favor and guidance of Almighty God.’”). 
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infer from the symbol a loss of access to government or a change in his 
or her understanding of the community norm.  Thus, the Court’s 
decision-making process should not make historical existence the 
dispositive factor in such a display’s violation of the Establishment 
Clause.  Under the expressive theory, an analysis of the reasonable 
inferences associated with each particular display is necessary. 
2. Aggregating Religious and Secular Symbols. 
A number of cases have dealt with situations where a religious 
image is aggregated with secular images.232  The Supreme Court 
generally finds that such aggregation of images does not violate the 
Establishment Clause.  Rather, the Court holds that such aggregation 
changes the meaning of the display from a religious message to a secular 
one.233  Yet, as we have just discussed regarding historical objects, 
focusing just on the image without consideration of any other factors 
ignores the important context within which the display exists.  For 
example, if a person lives in a heavily Christian community and has a 
valid and strong basis to believe that the current government intends to 
promote Christianity, he or she will be less likely to infer that the 
government is displaying the religious image as something other than a 
religious symbol.234  Further, if the person understands that it is against 
the law to simply display images from one faith without aggregating 
them with secular images, it will be absolutely possible and, indeed, 
reasonable for the person to infer that the other symbols are there only 
 
 232. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chap., 492 U.S. 573 
(1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 233. Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in County of Allegheny, described 
Lynch as follows: 
In reversing the lower court’s decision, which held that inclusion of the crèche 
in the holiday display violated the Establishment Clause, the Court stressed that 
the lower court erred in ‘focusing almost exclusively on the crèche.’  ‘In so 
doing, it rejected the city’s claim that its reasons for including the crèche are 
essentially the same as its reasons for sponsoring the display as a whole.’  
When viewed in the ‘context of the Christmas Holiday season,’ the Court 
reasoned, there was insufficient evidence to suggest that inclusion of the crèche 
as part of the holiday display was an effort to advocate a particular religious 
message.  The Court concluded that Pawtucket had a secular purpose for 
including the crèche in its Christmas holiday display, namely, ‘to depict the 
origins of that Holiday.’ 
City of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 624, (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 234. If a non-Christian sees a crèche on the lawn surrounding city hall, she will 
recognize it as a Christian symbol and no matter how many secular symbols accompany 
the crèche, it will have the same effect on her as a crèche standing alone—this is a 
Christian town and I am an outsider—because it still shows the government’s preference 
for Christianity. 
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because they need to be, and thus will adjust his or her sense of the value 
of Christian belief in society accordingly.  Certainly, as well, one will 
infer a lack of access to government. 
3. Private Displays on Government Property and Disclaimers:  
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette 
Certain government-owned property, such as streets and parks, are 
viewed as a “public forum” for purposes of the First Amendment and 
freedom of speech.235  Government regulation of speech in such a public 
forum must satisfy strict scrutiny, if the regulation is viewpoint or 
content-based.236  Thus, government may not have the authority to ban 
religious speech in a public park.237  Most government-owned property is 
not automatically considered a public forum.238  However, government 
can designate such property as a forum for speech.239  In doing so, 
government may make a choice, either designating the property as a 
public forum or as a limited public forum—meaning the speech can be 
limited by group or topic, but may not be limited by viewpoint.240  When 
government designates an area, such as the square surrounding the 
statehouse, as a forum for speech and a private party displays a religious 
symbol, Establishment Clause concerns arise.241  This was the situation 
in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette242 when the Ku 
Klux Klan displayed a Latin cross, “the principal symbol of Christianity 
around the world,” on the Capitol Square.243  The Klan’s application for a 
permit was denied, and it sued claiming a violation of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.244  In response, the state raised an 
Establishment Clause defense, arguing that the government would have 
violated the Establishment Clause if it had granted the permit.245 
Several concurring Justices (O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer), who 
agreed with the plurality in concluding that the display would not violate 
the Establishment Clause, discussed the role of a disclaimer in applying 
the endorsement test.246  Along with its application for a permit, the Klan 
indicated “that the cross would be accompanied by a disclaimer, legible 
 
 235. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). 
 241. See generally id. 
 242. Id. at 779-80. 
 243. Id. at 792 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 244. Id. at 758 (Scalia, J., plurality). 
 245. Id. at 759. 
 246. See id. at 772-83 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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‘from a distance,’ explaining that the cross was erected by private 
individuals ‘without government support.’”247  Because the state could 
have granted the application subject to the condition that the “Klan attach 
a disclaimer sufficiently large and clear to preclude any reasonable 
inference that the cross was there to ‘demonstrat[e] the government’s 
allegiance to, or endorsement of, the Christian faith,’”248 or that the state 
“could have instituted a policy of restricting all private, unattended 
displays to one area of the square, with a permanent sign marking the 
area as a forum for private speech carrying no endorsement from the 
State,”249 these Justices concluded the flat denial of the permit was not 
narrowly tailored. 
The Court’s conclusion regarding the expressive impacts of the 
cross attempts to treat the symbolic nature of the image without thorough 
consideration of the context of the decision.  Without such context, the 
decision becomes intuitively uncertain.  As we have discussed above, a 
proper expressive analysis would consider context.  Assume that, for 
example, other facts exist from which a reasonable person would infer 
that the mayor of the town has beliefs sympathetic to the Klan.  Perhaps 
the mayor was a member of a group with some ties to the Klan in the 
not-too-distant past.  Moreover, the local paper has quoted him as saying 
that true Americans are Christian and has printed disparaging comments 
he made about African Americans.250  Maybe it is known in the 
community that the mayor keeps company with a number of known Klan 
members.  Other facts may exist that give rise to the inference that the 
disclaimer was put in place only to protect the government from 
Establishment Clause challenges and not because of a true effort to 
distance the town from the beliefs of the Klan.  All these facts, when 
 
 247. Id. at 793 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 248. Id. at 794 (citations omitted). 
 249. Id. 
 250. This may seem an unbelievable set of facts, but both facts have recently been 
reported in newspapers.  Congressman Goode of Virginia, for example, has been quoted 
regarding his views of Christians and America in his recent attacks on Keith Ellison’s 
decision to be sworn in using a Koran.  See Brian DeBose, Jefferson’s Koran Used In 
Ceremony: First Muslim In Congress Hails Religious Freedom as ‘Foundation’, 
WASHINGTON TIMES (D.C.), Jan. 5, 2007, at A10; Shanna Flowers, Muslims are 
Americans, too, THE ROANOKE TIMES (Virginia), Dec. 28, 2006, at B1; The Goode Book, 
According to Virgil, THE ROANOKE TIMES (Virginia), Dec. 21, 2006, at B8; Goode’s 
Intolerance, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2006, at 34; Joel Havemann, House Member Seeks 
Restrictions on Muslims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at 36. 
Former Senator George Allen’s now infamous “Macaca” comment and Virginia 
delegate Frank Hargrove’s recent comment that Blacks should just get over slavery are 
two recent examples of how politician’s comments have been taken to indicate prejudice 
against African Americans.  See Michael Paul Williams, GOP Losing War For Black 
Voters’ Hearts, RICHMOND TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at B1; see also Gregory Kane, M-word 
Articulates Another Stereotype, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 7, 2007, at 1B. 
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established, would likely give rise to inferences regarding decreased 
access to government for Jews, Muslims, and other non-Christians. 
Of course, the few established facts in Capitol Square Rev. & 
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette suggest the opposite.251  In particular, the Klan’s 
application was denied, and the town demonstrated a willingness to fight 
the display in substantial litigation.252  The absence of all similarly 
relevant facts in the case, however, leaves the decision unsupported.  
Moreover, the absence of facts also leaves little in terms of guideposts 
regarding future decisions on cases of this kind. 
In sum, the Court’s existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
currently lacking due primarily to the inability to apply a full model of 
how government acts cause expressive effects to the underlying facts of 
each case analyzed.  As a result, existing jurisprudence provides little 
guidance regarding the disposition of future cases.  To the extent existing 
jurisprudence does develop guideposts, such guideposts are often 
unsatisfying because they do not resonate intuitively with our own 
understandings of how government acts actually affect beliefs and 
behavior.  The expressive test provides a mechanism for overcoming 
these concerns. 
4. Government Financial Aid to Religious Institutions 
As discussed above, recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,253 allow the government to fund religious 
institutions as long as there is a secular purpose, such as education, and 
the government dollars get to the religious institution as a result of a 
private decision.  Education vouchers were upheld, even though the 
private schools in the Cleveland area are predominantly Catholic and 
“pervasively sectarian.”254  The Court subjects financial aid to the same 
analysis it applied to government displays of religious symbols, even 
though the secular purpose for the financial aid is more real and apparent 
than in the religious symbols cases where the secular purpose is always 
difficult to identify.255 
Here, the Zelman situation is utilized to demonstrate the application 
of expressive law to the financial aid cases.  The state of Ohio created a 
pilot project scholarship program for one school district in the state, the 
Cleveland School District (CSD), which was among the worst 
 
 251. See generally 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 252. See id. at 757-60. 
 253. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 254. Id. at 692. 
 255. See generally id. 
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performing public school districts in the nation.256  There were around 
75,000 children in the CSD, the majority of whom were from low-
income and minority families.257  Fifty-six private schools located within 
the boundaries of the CSD participated in the program, forty-six (82%) 
of which were affiliated with a religious institution, and thirty-five of 
those forty-six were Catholic schools.258  Around 3,700 students 
participated in the voucher program and 96.6% of those students enrolled 
in private religious schools.259  Only 128 of them were enrolled in 
private, non-religious schools and, although public schools in the 
adjacent school districts were eligible for the vouchers, none of them 
chose to participate.260  The financial aid (vouchers) covered 90% of the 
private school tuition, up to $2,250 per child of families below 200% of 
poverty, and 75% of the private school tuition, up to $1,875 per child of 
other eligible families.261 The program also made tutorial aid available 
for students who remained in the public schools.262  During the year in 
question, the religious schools within the CSD received around 8.2 
million dollars in government aid.263 
The expressive test suggests that the Court’s decision to allow 
voucher programs in any situation where the government money gets to 
the religious institution through a private individual is overbroad.  Again, 
the expressive test finds such a bright-line rule intuitively unsatisfying 
because of its failure to consider context.  Indeed, the limited facts 
available about the Cleveland program demonstrate the kind of basis 
from which a reasonable person might infer that the government program 
is benefiting certain religions.  For example, the children in the CSD had 
five options: the regular public schools, which were not good; public 
magnet schools, which were already quite crowded (there were twenty-
three of these with around 13,000 children); a small number of 
community public schools of small size (there were ten of these with 
around 1,900 children); adjacent public schools (none of these 
participated); and a private school, forty-six of which were affiliated with 
a religion.264  For each eligible child, a voucher was issued to the parents, 
who selected one of the eligible schools at which to “spend” the 
voucher.265 
 
 256. Id. at 644. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 681. 
 259. Id. at 703. 
 260. Id. at 646. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 664-65. 
 264. Id. at 647-49. 
 265. See id. at 647. 
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Given the limited options in the Cleveland program, it is foreseeable 
that a large percentage of the students would go to religious private 
schools.  Moreover, the Cleveland program made no effort to lessen the 
effects of religion on these students by asking the private religious 
schools to permit “voucher” students to not take religious classes if they 
desired.  A reasonable person, understanding these facts, may determine 
that the Cleveland program expressed a government interest in 
promoting religion both through funding of religious schools and 
providing for increased religious education.  The fact that the money was 
distributed to private individuals over whom the government had no 
control certainly mediates against an inference that government was 
promoting specific religions.  However, because it privileged this fact 
over all other factors, the Court failed to consider the true expressive 
effects of the government behavior in this case.  Moreover, failing to 
recognize the importance of context creates little incentive for the parties 
in an Establishment Clause lawsuit to adduce the evidence necessary to 
make a full evaluation of the expressive effects of government action. 
V. Implications for Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
The expressive model provides significant benefits not found in the 
current tests applied to Establishment Clause claims.  The notion that 
government acts violate the Establishment Clause whenever they lead to 
reasonable inferences that change an individual’s sense of access to 
government or standing in the community provides a direct link between 
a government act and concerns of freedom of religion.  The expressive 
model suggests that an Establishment Clause violation should, in general, 
be found when government behaviors make individual religious behavior 
more costly.266  A number of other issues, however, remain to be 
considered under such a view of the Establishment Clause.  Most of 
these issues ultimately implicate the breadth of protection given to 
religious freedom under the Establishment Clause.  We will consider 
those concerns in this Section. 
A. Coercion v. Belief:  Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
Returning to the earlier example of a woman choosing whether to 
wear a headscarf when she goes downtown in her community, we can 
explain the relationship between coercion and beliefs in more detail.  
When the government act affects the woman’s belief about the beliefs of 
others (the subjective norm), it will also affect her calculation of the 
likelihood of being socially sanctioned.  The expected utility of wearing 
 
 266. See, e.g., notes 214-17 and related text. 
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the headscarf will decrease. 
 
Figure 8 
Pre Government Act 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Headscarf worn to respect God +90 +40 +3600 
    
Town values Christian behaviors +40  -60  -2400 
  Ao = Σ biei +1200 
  
Post Government Act 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Headscarf worn to respect God +90 +40 +3600 
    
Town values Christian behaviors +50 -60  -3000 
  Ao = Σ biei  +600 
 
The expected utility of wearing a headscarf has changed; the information 
provided by the government act has made it more costly for her to act on 
her beliefs publicly.267 
Of course, there are different types of coercion.  As we have 
discussed, Justice Scalia has written that the only type of coercion that he 
deems to violate the Establishment Clause is direct coercion.268  Many 
justices who apply the coercion test would seemingly agree with Justice 
 
 267. We recognize here that changing expected utility does not necessarily mean an 
individual will not undertake the behavior.  As we will discuss shortly, the behavior will 
change only if the change in belief certainty will change the expected utility of acting in 
accordance with one’s religious beliefs from a positive utility to a negative utility.  See 
infra Section V.B.  Coercion, however, in the framework used by Justice Scalia and 
economists is nothing more than an external cost associated with undertaking a particular 
behavior.  If the government were to fine people for undertaking a religious behavior it 
may not stop the behavior but it would certainly be coercive. 
 268. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Thus, while I 
have no quarrel with the Court’s general proposition that the Establishment Clause 
“guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion 
or its exercise,” I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts 
backed by threat of penalty—a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to 
those of us who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of 
Freud.  The Framers were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship by the 
National Government; but, as their own sponsorship of nonsectarian prayer in public 
events demonstrates, they understood that “[s]peech is not coercive; the listener may do 
as he likes.”).  Id. (citations omitted). 
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Scalia.269  However, Justice Kennedy clearly would not.270  He believes 
that coercion can be the result of social sanctions.271  Justice Scalia’s 
analysis of coercion reflects the basic rational actor model that underlies 
the expressive framework, by, for example, treating law as an external 
cost on the satisfaction of preference.272  Yet, Justice Scalia simply gets 
his rational actor model of coercion wrong.  Advocates of rational choice 
theory clearly recognize that rational individuals do care about esteem 
from others.273  While the social sanctioning mechanism is not direct—in 
that it does not come directly from the government, but works through 
the intermediary of society—such a difference is of little consequence in 
terms of its affect on the freedom of an individual to act in accordance 
with her religious beliefs.  In the case of a fine, imprisonment, or social 
esteem loss, the government act coerces the individual to not act in 
accordance with her religious beliefs.  The direct/indirect distinction is 
meaningless.  It would allow government to use social punishments that 
are often more powerful than small fines to accomplish the goals of 
limiting religious freedom. 
Justice Scalia would further suggest that the act of abiding by social 
norms is an act of respecting the values of others.274  At some level, this 
may be the case.  However, making something an act of respect does 
nothing to decrease the likelihood of social sanction.  In essence, Justice 
Scalia is somehow attempting to rewrite the way people should react to 
the government act, replacing concerns over one’s own belief with a 
 
 269. These Justices seemingly agree with Justice Scalia regarding the need for 
“direct” coercion as compared to Justice Kennedy’s approach, which would allow 
coercion to occur through social processes.  See notes 188-89. 
 270. See id. and accompanying text. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law 
and Social Norms, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 367 (2002). 
 273. See POSNER, supra note 160; Cooter, supra note 205; McAdams, Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, supra note 156. 
 274. Assuming the worst, that a nonparticipating graduate is “subtly coerced” to stand 
during the prayer, Justice Scalia says this does not “remotely establish” participation or 
the appearance of participation in the prayer because if it is a permissible inference that 
one who is standing is doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others that are in 
progress, then how can it possibly be said that a “reasonable dissenter . . . could believe 
that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval?”  Quite obviously, it 
cannot.  I may add, moreover, that maintaining respect for the religious observances of 
others is a fundamental civic virtue that government (including the public schools) can 
and should cultivate—so that even if it were the case that the displaying of such respect 
might be mistaken for taking part in the prayer, I would deny that the dissenter’s interest 
in avoiding even the false appearance of participation constitutionally trumps the 
government’s interest in fostering respect for religion generally.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 638 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  Of course, this ignores 
the fact that government has no interest in “fostering respect” for the government-
sponsored prayer or religion at issue in this case. 
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pride in being respectful of others.275  He is, in essence, asking people to 
divorce themselves from their basic cognitive makeup.  He assumes that 
people can easily expunge the deeply embedded desires for esteem and 
social belonging that have developed over millennia as a result of social 
interaction. 
B. How Much Is Enough?  Does Coercion Have to Change Behavior? 
Another implication of the expressive model deals with the 
perceived differences between coercion and affect on belief.  Such a 
difference is illusory.  Rather, the real perceived difference is one 
between whether the government act results in a change in behavior that 
is easily verified objectively or simply decreases the utility of a 
continued behavior.  Let’s return to our example of a Jewish man who 
wants to wear a yarmulke in a community that displays a crèche.  
Assume that the display has a small effect on belief certainty, but affects 
no particular behavior because overall utility of each behavior remains 
the same. 
 
Figure 9 
Belief Before Crèche is Displayed 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Wearing yarmulke satisfies 
religious requirements +80 +50 +4000 
    
Will decrease community esteem +30 -60  -1800 
  Ao = Σ biei +2200 
 
Figure 10 
Belief After Crèche Changes Belief About Community Preference to 
Increase Certainty of Sanction (the Subjective Norm): 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Wearing yarmulke satisfies 
religious requirements +80 +50 +4000 
    
Will decrease community esteem +40 -60  -2400 
  Ao = Σ biei +1600 
 
The crèche will have an affect on belief and on the expected utility of 
undertaking a particular behavior, but it does not change this individual’s 
 
 275. See id. 
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willingness to wear a yarmulke in this case.  As previously discussed, 
this act is still coercive.  However, the coercion does not result in a 
change in behavior.  Thus, it is more difficult to prove the coercive 
nature of the act.  One may claim the act effected his ease or comfort of 
wearing a yarmulke, but this type of testimony will likely have little 
persuasive effect if the individual continues to wear it. 
Of course, the above model is generally not reflective of reality.  In 
most cases there will be a distribution of effects on different people.  
Some of the people affected will evaluate the importance of following 
religious rules more highly and some less so.  Similarly, some 
individuals will evaluate esteem from the community more highly than 
others.  For those who value community esteem highly and are less 
strongly committed to religious practices, such acts as the display of a 
crèche will be more likely to change their behaviors.  Further, there are 
any number of behaviors that may be effected by the change in certainty 
regarding the subjective norm besides wearing a yarmulke.  For example, 
the same person may be less concerned about bowing her head while a 
Christian prayer is said because she does not actually take part in such 
prayer, but goes along with the behavior because of the social costs of 
failing to do so.276  In such cases, behavior that is contrary to religious 
belief is being changed through coercive pressure.  It is thus highly 
unlikely that a government act will not have an effect on religious 
behavior in most instances.  Where it does not change behavior, 
however, it may still be having a coercive effect. 
Clearly, the notion that affects on belief are enough to violate the 
Establishment Clause is congruent with the endorsement test and its 
requirement that government acts only affect beliefs about one’s status as 
an insider or outsider.  It is less clear whether those who require coercion 
would similarly agree.  Generally, the coercion test focuses on the nature 
of the coercion—that it be the result of a formal penalty.  As previously 
demonstrated, this distinction makes little sense.  Social sanctions can be 
even more coercive in terms of their affects on expected utility than 
government sanctions, such as penalties or prison.277  The nature of the 
penalty, and not its effect, thus dominates the coercion test approach.  
One could assume a situation where a penalty does not change behavior.  
For example, assume the government penalizes wearing a yarmulke in 
public with a $50 fine and that this penalty is rarely enforced.  Such a 
government act would be considered coercive even if no one changed 
their behavior in response to it.  This is because individuals recognize 
 
 276. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 277. See James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 
YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). 
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such external costs—whether they are in the form of monetary fines or 
social sanctions—as a restriction on the free exercise of religion, 
regardless of the effect on behavior. 
C. Concerns Regarding Impacts on Outgroup Members 
Thus far, this Article has been concerned with the way the messages 
created by government’s religious acts affect in-group members.  That is, 
when the group is defined as the community served by the government, 
the focus has been on the effect of the act on the beliefs of people in the 
community.  At first blush, this seems like the proper inquiry.  Norm 
scholars have recognized that in-group messages are much more 
persuasive than out-group messages.278  However, the expressive theory 
also provides an understanding of how government acts may work 
through religious inferences to affect out-group members.  In particular, 
it suggests that, to the extent an out-group member is interested in 
joining the community and knows of the signals, he or she may feel 
coerced not to join the community.  Put simply, if government behavior 
leads to inferences that the community does not value an individual’s 
religious beliefs or prefers another belief, he or she will be less likely to 
move. 
The processes by which information is received by out-group 
members would be similar to any other inferences or direct information.  
To the extent they visit the community, out-group members gather 
information based on their personal experiences. They see the private 
signals—the bumper stickers, store displays, and home displays—that 
reflect the religious preferences of the community.  The expressive 
analysis could be used to consider whether a reasonable inference of 
community or government preference could be drawn from the 
government display. 
A separate matter, however, concerns individuals who do not have 
such experiences.  In these cases, knowledge of a particular government 
display may be actually more influential.  That is, absent other 
information, the individual will be more likely to see the government 
behavior as reflective of community sentiment.279  The same 
requirements of reasonable inference can be placed on an out-group 
member as an in-group member.  What the expressive analysis makes 
clear, however, is the threshold concern that government behavior affects 
 
 278. See Robert J. Aalberts & Kenneth C. Fonte, Is Section 2C of the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct Justified?  An Empirical Study of the Impropriety of Judges Belonging 
to Exclusive Clubs, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 608-12 (1995). 
 279. This, of course, is subject to pre-existing beliefs that connect government to 
majority and not to concentrated capital.  See supra Section III.A.2.b.i. 
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individuals who are not members of the community.  While current 
expressive jurisprudence asks only about those in the political 
community, it may need to be expanded to consider such out-group 
members. 
VI. Conclusion 
Government acts convey information, both directly and 
inferentially.  When government acts, such as the display of religious 
symbols on government property, convey information about the religious 
preferences of government, that information may affect our religious 
freedom by making acting in accordance with religious beliefs more 
costly.  If one’s exercise of a particular religious belief places her at a 
disadvantage in the  community, socially, politically or economically, 
then she has been deprived of religious freedom.  The same is true if the 
fact that she is not a religious person has this effect. Even if she chooses 
to exercise her religious belief and risk the resulting disadvantage, 
government has required her to make a choice that she should not have to 
make.  By examining what reasonable inferences a person might draw 
from the government acts at issue, courts will be in a better position to 
assess the actual effect of the acts on religious freedom.  Of course, a 
wide variety of factors, including an individual’s pre-existing beliefs and 
the actions of individuals in the community, will affect the 
reasonableness of her inferences.  While the process is not a complete 
departure from the endorsement or subtle coercion approaches taken by 
members of the Court, the use of a comprehensive expressive model will 
lead to a better assessment of the actual effect of government acts on 
religious freedom. 
 
